








CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
 
    
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
 
ADVERTIMENT. L'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi doctoral i la seva utilització ha de respectar els drets 
de la persona autora. Pot ser utilitzada per a consulta o estudi personal, així com en activitats o materials 
d'investigació i docència en els termes establerts a l'art. 32 del Text Refós de la Llei de Propietat Intel·lectual 
(RDL 1/1996). Per altres utilitzacions es requereix l'autorització prèvia i expressa de la persona autora. En 
qualsevol cas, en la utilització dels seus continguts caldrà indicar de forma clara el nom i cognoms de la 
persona autora i el títol de la tesi doctoral. No s'autoritza la seva reproducció o altres formes d'explotació 
efectuades amb finalitats de lucre ni la seva comunicació pública des d'un lloc aliè al servei TDX. Tampoc 
s'autoritza la presentació del seu contingut en una finestra o marc aliè a TDX (framing). Aquesta reserva de 
drets afecta tant als continguts de la tesi com als seus resums i índexs. 
 
 
ADVERTENCIA. El acceso a los contenidos de esta tesis doctoral y su utilización debe respetar los 
derechos de la persona autora. Puede ser utilizada para consulta o estudio personal, así como en 
actividades o materiales de investigación y docencia en los términos establecidos en el art. 32 del Texto 
Refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual (RDL 1/1996). Para otros usos se requiere la autorización 
previa y expresa de la persona autora. En cualquier caso, en la utilización de sus contenidos se deberá 
indicar de forma clara el nombre y apellidos de la persona autora y el título de la tesis doctoral. No se 
autoriza su reproducción u otras formas de explotación efectuadas con fines lucrativos ni su comunicación 
pública desde un sitio ajeno al servicio TDR. Tampoco se autoriza la presentación de su contenido en una 
ventana o marco ajeno a TDR (framing). Esta reserva de derechos afecta tanto al contenido de la tesis como 
a sus resúmenes e índices. 
 
 
WARNING. Access to the contents of this doctoral thesis and its use must respect the rights of the author. It 
can be used for reference or private study, as well as research and learning activities or materials in the 
terms established by the 32nd article of the Spanish Consolidated Copyright Act (RDL 1/1996). Express and 
previous authorization of the author is required for any other uses. In any case, when using its content, full 
name of the author and title of the thesis must be clearly indicated. Reproduction or other forms of for profit 
use or public communication from outside TDX service is not allowed. Presentation of its content in a window 
or frame external to TDX (framing) is not authorized either. These rights affect both the content of the thesis 






Directed by Dr. Jordi Castellà Roca
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Abstract
Web search engines (WSEs) collect and store information about their users
in order to tailor their services better to their users’ needs. Nevertheless,
while receiving a personalized attention, users lose control over their own
data. Search logs can disclose sensitive information and the real identities
of users, thus creating serious risks of privacy breaches. Privacy preserving
techniques seek to limit these risks by modifying the data. Although pri-
vacy is preserved, the data utility is reduced in a consequence of the data
modifications. Achieving a good trade-off between privacy and utility can
be a difficult task. In the present thesis we discuss the problem of limiting
privacy disclosure risks in search logs while preserving enough data utility.
The first part of this thesis focuses on the methods to prevent the gathering
of information by WSEs. Since search logs are convenient in order to receive
an accurate service, the aim is to provide logs that are still suitable to provide
personalization. To that end, we propose a protocol which uses a social
network in order to hide the queries submitted by a user. Results shows
that users achieve good levels of privacy, meanwhile the response time of
the protocol is acceptable.
The second part of this thesis deals with the dissemination of search logs. We
propose microaggregation techniques which allow the publication of search
logs while providing a high privacy protection. Aimed at minimizing the
information loss, the proposals are specifically developed to deal with query
logs. Evaluation shows that our proposals achieve good trade-offs between
privacy and utility, outperforming the previous methods.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my director Jordi, whose expertise made this thesis
possible. I would also like to thank my father, my mother and the rest of
my family for their unconditional support. I am very grateful to Pierangela
Samarati for her thoughtful comments during my stay in Crema. And last
but not least, to Patricia for her patience and support when there was no
sign of light at the end of the tunnel.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 




1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Preliminaries 7
2.1 Types of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Statistical Disclosure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Microdata release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Microaggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 MDAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6 k-anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 State of the art 15
3.1 Client-side obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.1 Uncollaborative schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.2 Collaborative schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 Server-side disclosure control techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4 Client-side anonymization 27
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3 Protocol for protecting the privacy of the users . . . . . . . . 29
4.3.1 The protocol in detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3.2 Sending probability Ps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3.3 Query forward function Ψf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3.4 User selection function Ψ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3.5 Selfishness function Υ(N) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.5.1 Coprivacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
ix
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
CONTENTS
4.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.5 Profile Exposure Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5.1 Mutual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.6 Usability measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.7 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.7.1 Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.7.2 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.7.2.1 Simulation results from scenarios without self-
ish users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.7.2.2 Simulation results from scenarios with selfish
users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.7.3 Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.8.1 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5 Server-side anonymization 55
5.1 Search logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2 Search logs release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.3 Microaggregation of search logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.3.1 Microaggregation of query logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.1.1 Distance and aggregation of query logs . . . 59
5.3.1.2 User query distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.3.1.3 Comments on the distance function . . . . . 62
5.3.1.4 User query aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.3.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.3.2.1 Profile Exposure Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.3.2.2 Information loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.3.2.3 On the relation of PEL and IRL . . . . . . . 67
5.3.2.4 Utility in data mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3.2.5 Frequency analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3.3.1 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4 Semantic microaggregation of search logs . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4.1 Towards a semantic interpretation of query logs . . . . 76
5.4.1.1 ODP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.4.1.2 An ODP similarity measure . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4.2 ODP-based microaggregation of query logs . . . . . . 78
x
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
CONTENTS
5.4.3 Data preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.4.3.1 Partition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.4.3.2 Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.4.4.1 Usefulness Evaluation Method . . . . . . . . 85
5.4.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4.4.3 ODP levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4.4.4 SRP vs. ODP-categories . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.4.4.5 Computational cost vs. ODP-categories . . . 89
5.4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.4.5.1 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.5 Semantic microaggregation optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5.1 Query anonymization method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5.1.1 Query processing and conceptual mapping . 93
Query processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Conceptual mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Knowledge base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.5.1.2 Semantic data partition . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Comparing queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
User query log comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Centroid calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.5.1.3 Query log anonymization . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.5.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.5.2.1 Evaluation measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.5.2.2 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.5.2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.5.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.5.3.1 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6 Conclusions 123
6.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.2 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.3 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Bibliography 129
xi
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 





In recent years, the problem of properly protecting personal information
has received a lot of attention due to the vast amount of information that
is collected by Internet companies. Thanks to the evolution of information
technologiess, every transaction performed by an individual is stored, an-
alyzed or even shared or disseminated. The queries submitted to a Web
Search Engine (WSE) are an example.
WSEs have become one of the most successful services on Internet, respond-
ing to the demand for information facilities and services of the Information
Society. By providing an easy way to access the Web, WSEs receive sev-
eral hundred million queries each day. For example, during 2011, the WSE
Google received near 5 000 million queries per day [42]. All these transac-
tions are collected and stored as search or query logs.
The reasons why WSEs maintain the search logs [21] can be classified into
the three following categories:
• Personalization. WSEs provide their users result pages related to
1
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
their searches (web pages containing links to the resulting data) in the
web search process. From the huge amount of results, often thousands,
only some links are relevant to the user’s needs; meanwhile the other
ones are irrelevant. The study presented in [49] states that a 68% of
the users of WSEs click a search result within the first page of results.
Even more relevant is the fact that a 92% of the users click a result
within the first three pages of search results. Within WSEs business
scenario, providing accurate results in order to further gain clients
and developing loyalty is crucial. Hence, in order to satisfy the user’s
needs, links should be ranked accoding to their relevance to the user,
i.e. relevant links to the user should be placed in the first positions of
the returned results.
Nevertheless, ranking the search results according to the users’ needs
is a real challenge. Queries are usually composed by few words which
cannot refer to specific information or can contain ambiguous terms
(terms that have different meanings). For example, the word Java
can refer to the Java programming language or to the island of Java.
Without any other knowledge, it is impossible to know which meaning
Java has in the query. Thus, WSEs have to disambiguate the queries
by identifying the correct sense when they have different ones. This
process requires the knowledge of: (i) the interests of the user; and
(ii) the query context. For example, if a certain user is interested in
computer science, the WSE will assume she is referring to the Java pro-
gramming language. The disambiguation process is used by schemes
of Personalized Search (PS) [81, 90, 94, 110].
By analyzing the stored logs, WSEs are able to extract these users’
interests, which help to improve the accuracy of the search results
and to personalize the advertisements. The latter is very important
in the bussines model of the WSE as it provides high revenues. For
instance, in 2012, Google had a revenue of 43 686 million dollars from
advertisement [43].
• Improving search. Past searches are an invaluable resource to im-
2
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1.1. Motivation
prove the quality of search results. By knowing the frequencies of most
formulated queries and most selected results, WSEs are able to im-
prove the ranking algorithms [2] and to suggest reformulated queries
that can add specificity to the user’s initial query [56]. Moreoever,
query logs provide information on how people employ language, which
can be useful to improve features such as query spelling corrections or
to recognize when a user is posing a question.
• Sharing data. Aside from the information retrieval role, WSEs can
act as an information source for third parties. Query logs are of great
interest for researchers [6] to study and test new Information Retrieval
(IR) algorithms, to learn about users information needs and query for-
mulation approaches [57], and also to investigate the use of language
in queries [100]. Marketing companies can exploit query logs to char-
acterize general user profiles, behavior and search habits [82, 12], to
have competitive advantage over their counterparts, to improve key-
word advertising campaigns [57] and to extract market tendencies and
trending topics [45]. Moreover, governmental authorities can force the
WSEs to disclose query logs of specific users or groups [111, 98].
Query logs cleary contain valuable information although in most cases, logs
also contain personal information of the users [95]. These are some examples
of this situation: (i) if a certain user has searched for a certain place, it can
be inferred that she lives there; (ii) if she searches a certain disease, it can be
deduced that she (or someone close to her) suffers that disease; and (iii) the
user can make a vanity query in which she searches for her own name [59, 95].
Moreover, a query can itself contain information about several issues. For
instance, a simple query as Drug Clinic Portland is probably disclosing that
the user lives in Portland and has some problems with drugs.
Not surprisingly, privacy disclosure risks arise when the WSEs want to dis-
seminate query logs. These risks can be classified into two categories: (i)
identity disclosure when a user is re-identifyed; (ii) attribute disclosure when
information about a user is retrieved. Hence, the main threat exposed by a
3
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
search log is to be able to link user queries with a real identity. In order to
avoid these risks, WSEs should protect the data prior to their dissemination.
The protection of query logs implies some data modifications which limit
the privacy disclosure risks although at the same time they reduce the data
reliability. The problem is that achieving a desirable degree of privacy in
search logs is not easy and presents an important trade-off between the
privacy and utility of the data. While the utility is conditional to the ability
of performing a latter analysis with the data, privacy is conditional to the
ability of disclosing information about the users, although it is done with the
help of external information. Several authors [1, 55, 82] have discussed about
how the combination of the modified data can disclose enough information
to re-identify some users. Hence, although query logs can be protected prior
to their publication, there is no absolute guarantee of anonymity.
There is at least one well-known case of privacy disclosure in search logs
which shows that achieving a desirable degree of privacy in search logs is
not easy. AOL Research, in an attempt to help the information retrieval
research community, released in 2006 around 21 million queries performed
by 650 000 costumers over a period of 3 months. Although the records were
previously de-identified, two reporters of the New York Times were able
to locate AOL customer no. 4417749 as Thelma Arnold, a 62 years old
widow living in Lilburn [7], from the query logs, and quite a lot of other
sensitive information was exposed. The case ended up not only with an
important damage to AOL users’ privacy, but also with a major damage
to AOL itself, with several class action suits and complaints against the
company [34, 71, 89].
1.2 Contributions
The release of query logs from AOL with poor protection was a mistake
normally regarded as a bad initiative taken by the company. Our objective
4
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1.2. Contributions
is to provide a stronger anonymization so query logs collected by search
engine companies do not pose a risk to the privacy of their users.
In a standard WSE scenario, the protection of query logs limiting improper
disclosures can be addressed from two different points:
• Client-side. WSEs have no interest to give users control over the col-
lected data because: (i) query logs helps to improve the information
retrieval service and therefore the users’ satisfaction; (ii) the business
model of the WSEs is based on advertisements, whose efficacy relies
on their personalization. Moreover, once the personal data are gath-
ered, users can do nothing to prevent the WSE from using them for
commercial purposes, putting their privacy at risk. The AOL case is
an example of this.
Accordingly, users attempt to obfuscate the information that WSEs
can gather about them by using some obfuscation mechanisms. In this
way, users prevent that WSEs create a detailed profile about them, lim-
iting the privacy breaches. However, the profile should contain enough
reliable information if the user wants to obtain an acurate service. In
addition, if the user anonymizes her own profile in a proper way, her
privacy will be properly protected agains a data dissemination.
In this sense, we propose a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocol that exploits
social networks in order to protect the privacy of the users from the
profiling mechanisms of the WSEs. In order to be usable in practice,
the protocol should resist the presence of users who do not behave
properly (i.e. adversaries) and should also offer a short response time.
Due to the lack of a standard measure to evaluate the privacy protec-
tion achieved, we need to define a new one.
• Server-side. The WSE wants to share or outsource the collected
query logs without putting the privacy of users at risk. For this reason,
it anonymizes the query logs using techniques such as privacy preserv-
ing data mining (PPD) and statistical disclosure control (SDC).
5
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Disseminated query logs should preserve the privacy of the users, but
at the same time they should be suitable to perform a posterior anal-
ysis. In order to do so, we propose to apply microaggregation tech-
niques. As microaggregation offers k-anonymity privacy, then the ob-
jective is to minimize the information loss. To that end, appropriate
similarity and aggregation functions to query logs should be proposed.
The rest of the present thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives some
basic definitions. Chapter 3 reviews the state of the art on WSEs users.
A proposal to prevent the information gathering by the WSE is presented
in Chapter 4. The following chapter (Chapter 5) presents three new mi-
croaggregation techniques to disseminate query logs. Finally, conclusions
and future work are drawn in Chapter 6.
6
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2.1 Types of data
Data sets can contain information on individuals (microdata) of aggregated
information (macrodata). For instance, a telephone survey which contains
the answers of respondents is a microdata set, while a list of average wages
in the European countries is a macrodata set.
2.2 Statistical Disclosure Control
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) techniques are needed to limit the risks
of information inference in microdata. SDC techniques seek to disseminate
statistical information in such a way that no confidential information about
a specific individual can be inferred. To that end, data are modified to
provide sufficient protection while trying to keep the information loss at
minimum.
7
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Internet services collect and store information about their users in order to
tailor their services better to their users’ needs. Nowadays, these data are
usually released in form of microdata because they have the advantage to
be more flexible than the aggregated macrodata.
A microadata set is usually represented in a tabular form, where each record
contains attributes (data) of an individual respondent (user). These at-
tributes can be either numerical or categorical, and they are usually classi-
fied in the following categories, which are not mutually exclusive, depending
on their content:
• Identifiers. Attributes which unambiguously identify the respondent.
For example, the passport number, the credit card number, the full
name, etc. Such data are usually removed because they are not valu-
able for the advanced functionalities and constitute a high privacy
threat.
• Quasi-identifiers. Attributes that cannot identify a user. However,
in combination or with the help of external information (for instance
the information of public databases), they can re-identify the respon-
dent. The zipcode, age, first name, etc. are some examples. For
instance, zipcode and age are probably not enough to identify the re-
spondent, although she can be identified if her first name is unusual
in this zone.
• Confidential attributes. The attributes contain sensitive informa-
tion of users. Examples are religion, illnesses, investments, etc.
• Non-confidential attributes Attributes that do not contain sen-
sitive information. Country names and favorite sports can be some
examples. However, they can also constitute an identity disclosure
risk because in combination they can form quasi-identifiers.
8
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
2.3. Microdata release
Privacy disclosure risks of microdata can be classified into two categories:
identity disclosure and attribute disclosure. The identity disclosure is pro-
duced when an attacker detects the presence of an individual; meanwhile,
the attribute disclosure is produced when an attacker retrieves sensitive in-
formation about a respondent.
In the literature we can find several proposals which anonymize/de-identify
microdata in order to minimize the disclosure risks of the disseminated
data [25]. They usually perform transformations over potentially identifying
data, reducing the level of specificity (e.g. zip code can be transformed from
12345 to 123XX; specific ages can be grouped in a range, such as 15-25; a
job name can be generalized from plastic surgeon to doctor, etc.) and/or
making groups of individuals indistinguishable (e.g. the set of ages of sev-
eral individuals 15, 17, 20, 21 are replaced by their average 18). These
transformations distort input data, making them less specific or detailed,
a dimension commonly referred and quantified as Information Loss (IL).
Since the utility of anonymized data is closely related to the amount of in-
formation loss, anonymization methods should balance the trade-off between
information loss and disclosure risk [25].
In order to achieve this goal, within the Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC)
community, authors have proposed many techniques to anonymize struc-
tured databases, which consist of records with several univalued attributes,
while minimizing the information loss [25, 54, 67, 69]. In these meth-
ods, identifier attributes are removed, and quasi-identifier attributes are
anonymized by transforming the data. Confidential attributes can remain
unaltered, thus enabling posterior analyses. Anonymization of quasi-identifier
attributes is usually done so that the masked database fulfills the k-anonymity
property. A database is k-anonymous if each record is indistinguishable
from, at least k − 1, other records with respect to their quasi-identifier at-
tributes [91, 99].
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Microaggregation [23] is a family of statistical disclosure control techniques,
which provides privacy by means of clustering the data into small clusters
and then replacing the original data by the centroids of the corresponding
clusters.
Privacy is achieved because all clusters have at least a predefined number
of elements, and therefore, there are at least k records with the same value.
Note that all the records in the cluster replace their quasi-identifier values
by the values the centroid of the cluster has. The constant k is a parameter
of the method that controls the level of privacy. The larger the k, the more
privacy the protected data will have.
Microaggregation was originally defined for numerical attributes [23], but
later extended to other domains; e.g., to categorical data in [104] (see
also [33]) and in constrained domains in [106].
From the operational point of view, microaggregation is defined in terms of
partition and aggregation:
• Partition. Records are partitioned into several clusters, each of them
consisting of at least k records.
• Aggregation. For each of the clusters a representative (the centroid)
is computed, and then original records are replaced by the representa-
tive of the cluster to which they belong.
From a formal point of view, microaggregation can be defined as an op-
timization problem with some constraints. We give a formalization below
using uij to describe the partition of the records in the sensitive data set X.
That is, uij = 1 if record j is assigned to the ith cluster. Let vi be the repre-
sentative of the ith cluster, then a general formulation of microaggregation
with g clusters and a given k is as follows:
10
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i=1 uij = 1 for all j = 1, . . . , n
2k ≥
∑n
j=1 uij ≥ k for all i = 1, . . . , g
uij ∈ {0, 1}
For numerical data it is usual to require that d(x, v) is the Euclidean dis-
tance. In the general case, when attributes V = (V1, . . . , Vs) are considered,





it is also common to require for numerical data that vi is defined as the arith-





However, it has been proved that finding the optimal data partition con-
sidering more than one variable at a time (multivariate microaggregation)
is in general NP-Hard [78]. Hence, approximation algorithms to optimal
microaggregation have been proposed.
2.5 MDAV
MDAV [30] (Maximum Distance to Average Vector) is an approximation
algorithm to optimize the micoaggregation. MDAV stands out from other
microaggregation methods since it is specifically designed to minimize the
information loss [29, 66].
The behavior of the method is depicted in Algorithm 1. Data partition
begins by calculating the centroid of the whole dataset and selecting the
most distant record (xr) to it. Then, a cluster is constructed with the k-1
least distant records to xr. After that, the most distant record xs to xr is
selected and a new cluster is constructed. The process is repeated until less
than 2k records remain ungrouped. Remaining records are grouped together
in a last cluster. As a result, all clusters will have k records, except for the
last one, which may have from k to 2k−1 records (considering that the input
11
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dataset is not multiple of k). Finally, data anonymization is performed by
replacing each record of each cluster by the centroid of the cluster.
MDAV, like most SDC methods, has been originally designed to deal with
numerical data. As discussed in the introduction, numbers can be easily
managed by means of arithmetical operators. In this case, the Euclidean
distance and the arithmetic average have normally been used to compare and
anonymize numerical data [33]. However, the application of MDAV to free
textual data such as query logs is not straightforward, since semantically-
grounded operators are needed to accurately compare and transform them.
Even though some authors have applied the MDAV method to categorical
data, most of them limited to terminological comparisons [33].
2.6 k-anonymity
The k-anonymity principle [91, 99] has been widely used to protect the
identities of the respondents against re-identification attacks in relational
databases. A protected dataset is said to satisfy k-anonymity if each com-
bination of quasi-identifier attributes appears at least k times, i.e. each
respondent is indistinguishable from at least other k − 1 respondents.
k-anonymity bears some resemblance to the underlying principle of microag-
gregation. In fact, when all variables are considered at once, microaggrega-
tion is a way to implement k-anonymity.
Traditionally, k-anonymity is achieved by generalizing or suppressing quasi-
identifier attributes, thus causing information loss owing to the reduction of
details of the released data. While privacy protection is given by parameter
k, information loss can be minimized by reducing the required generaliza-
tions and suppressions.
However, while k-anonymity offers protection against identity disclosure,
attribute disclosure is still possible. As a consequence, several extensions
12
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Require: X: original data set, k: integer
Ensure: X ′: anonymized data set
X = X ′
/*Data Partition*/
while |X| ≥ 3× k do
Compute centroid cx of all records in X
Find the most distant record xr to centroid cx
Form a cluster inX ′ that contains xr together with its k−1 least distant
records
Remove these records from X
Find the most distant record xs to xr
Form a cluster inX ′ that contains xs together with its k−1 least distant
records
Remove these records from X
end while
if |X| ≥ 2× k then
Compute centroid cx of all records in X
Find the most distant record xr to centroid cx
Form a cluster inX ′ that contains xr together with its k−1 least distant
records
Remove these records from X
end if
Form a cluster in X ′ with the remaining records
/*Data anonymization*/
for each cluster q in X ′ do
Compute centroid cq of all records in q
Replace all records of q in X ′ by their centroid cq
end for
13
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of the k-anonymity principle have been proposed in the literature. Among
them, l-diversity [65] and t-closeness [61] are the most important ones.
• l-diversity. When some sensitive attributes of a group of respondents
which share the same quasi-identifier set of attributes are the same,
this sensitive information is unprotected. To fix this drawback, l-
diversity requires the presence of at least l different values for the
sensitive attributes.
• t-closeness. The knowledge of the frequency distribution of sensitive
attribute values can help an attacker to reduce her uncertainty about
sensitive information of an individual. To fix this drawback, t-closeness
requires that the sensitive value distribution of any set of respondents
which share the same quasi-identifier attributes differ from the overall
sensitive value distribution by a threshold t at most.
Although the extensions of k-anonymity minimize attribute disclosure, their
privacy principle is the same. Hence, the proposed methods in this work ad-
dress k-anonymity protection, yet they can be adapted to provide l-diversity
and t-closeness.
14
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
Chapter 3
State of the art
Different ways in which WSEs retrieve the user’s interests have been pro-
posed by several authors. In [97], the authors use the browsing history.
The use of click-through data is proposed in [85]. In [96, 86], two schemes
which introduce the use of web communities for this purpose are presented.
In [101], the authors present a client side application which stores the inter-
ests of the users. Nevertheless, the use of the queries previously submitted
by users have been proved to be the best approach [96, 41]. This latter
mechanism is very effective because it profiles users without their collabo-
ration.
In this chapter we review the existing proposals to protect the privacy of
the users of the WSEs. This proposals can be classified into two categories:
client-side and server-side. We start with the client-side mechanisms which
help users to obfuscate their profiles. Then, we present the server-side diclo-
sure control techniques that search engines can apply in order to disseminate
the data while limiting privacy disclosure risks.
15
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3.1 Client-side obfuscation
Privacy concerns have a long history. They already existed in information
retrieval from public databases. In this field, when a user submits a query,
she is also exposing her interests to the database operator. Since the early
80s, several proposals to hide this personal information have emerged in
order to address this situation.
Those proposals can be classified according to the existence of cooperation
between the entities involved in the searching process: (i) the uncollaborative
schemes where the user has got the cooperation of neither other users nor the
WSE; and (ii) the collaborative schemes where the users has de coooperation
of either other users or the WSE. We next summarize the different existing
schemes of each type.
3.1.1 Uncollaborative schemes
Intuitively, it can be assumed that the privacy of users can be preserved
by preventing the WSE from identifying the true source of the query. In
this way, the WSE cannot link users with their queries and it cannot create
their profiles. A trivial way to provide anonymity to users who use a WSE
is to use dynamic IPs and a web browser without cookies. However, this
approach has the following drawbacks:
• The renewal policy of the dynamic IP address is not controlled by
the user but the network operator. This operator can always give the
same IP address to the same Media Access Control (MAC) address.
Nevertheless, certain users require static IP addresses.
• A browser without cookies loses its usability in a high number of web
applications. This situation may not be affordable for certain users.
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Another straightforward way to conceal the source of a query is using an
anonymizing proxy. There are many public proxy servers available on the
Internet. When a user wants to submit a query to a WSE, she sends the
query to the proxy. Then, the proxy submits the query to the WSE, receives
the response and sends it back to the user. The whole process is done
anonymously, i.e. the true source of the query remains hidden. However,
since all the queries are sent through the same proxy, they can be easily
linked together by the proxy itself. An adversary with access to the logs of
the proxy could identify the true source of the queries.
This problem can be solved by using a group of proxies instead of only
one. In this way, Chaum proposed in [17] the use of an anonymity network
which consists of several routers that act as anonymizers. The input and
the output routers in the network are rotated among them. Therefore, logs
from all the routers are necessary in order to link the queries which have
been generated by the same user. There are many implementations of this
scheme. Probably, the Tor Project [103] is the most renowned.
The main drawback of this approach is that user cannot receive a personal-
ized search. Moreover, the process of submitting a query to the WSE and
receiving the answer through an anonymous channel is very time-consuming.
The authors in [90] used the anonymous network Tor with paths of length
two (note that the default length is three) and submitting a query was, on
average, 25 times slower than performing a direct search. In addition, anony-
mous channels are not sufficient to preserve the privacy of users. They only
take care of the data transport, hence users should use specific programs
to hide identifying information. This information can be obtained from the
cookies, the HTTP headers or from active components of the websites.
This situation is usually solved by using the anonymity network in combi-
nation with an HTTP filter like Privoxy [84]. This tool attempts to delete
all the unnecessary information that users submit to the WSE. As a re-
sult of this process, the disclosure of personal information is reduced but
it does not improve the response time of a query submission. In addition,
17
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Privoxy is a general-purpose filter and it does not remove active components
like JavaScript or ActiveX. FoxTor [88] and TorButon [103] are two FireFox
plug-ins that combine a Tor network with a Privoxy filter.
An alternative method for providing privacy is based on obfuscating the pro-
files by means of noise. Submitting false random queries is an intuitive way
of achieving it. Schemes that follow this approach provide non-anonymous
privacy in the sense that a certain user can be identified but her interests re-
main hidden. The authors in [94] state that this approach can be considered
as a way to get k-anonymity. The author in [99] explains that a release pro-
vides k-anonymity protection if the information for each person contained
in the release cannot be distinguished from at least k− 1 individuals whose
information also appears in the release. In a WSE scenario, a protection
level comparable with k-anonymity is achieved if a query of a certain user
cannot be distinguished from at least k−1 queries generated by other users.
This means that k different queries have the same probability of being the
real one.
The main difficulty in generating false random queries is selecting the query
terms properly. Some proposals choose the false query terms outside the
interests of the user [36, 35, 32]. These proposals try to confuse the WSE.
On the other hand, schemes presented in [58, 48] select the false query terms
from the topics which are relevant to the user. This latter approach focuses
on the general areas of interest of the user. The specific ones are avoided.
In the literature, there are two main works based on these two approaches:
• TrackMeNot [48] uses the periods when the activity of the users is low
to submit random queries to the WSEs. In this way, the system does
not affect the normal work of the users. However, sending fake queries
increases the network traffic and overloads the WSEs. As a result,
this scheme protects the privacy of the users but it also reduces the
network and WSEs performance. In addition, this behavior introduces
a serious privacy threat: for each user, the WSE is able to divide all her
18
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queries depending on whether or not they have been submitted during
working hours (according to the time zone of the user). Probably, all
the queries which have been submitted out of the working hours have
been sent by TrackMeNot. The period of time between the submission
of two different queries can also be used for the same purpose: it can
be assumed that when users are working, they do not submit only one
query but several in a short period.
• GooPIR [32] submits a bunch of queries that contain fake words to-
gether with the authentic term. The WSE cannot know which words
are fake and which are not. In this way, the profile of the user is ob-
fuscated and her privacy is protected. This proposal uses a Thesaurus
in order to decide which words can be added to each search. Thus,
GooPIR can only submit words. Full sentences are not addressed
(note that sentences cannot be formed by random words). Moreover,
the system assumes that the frequencies of keywords and phrases that
can appear in a query are known and available: for maximum privacy,
the frequencies of the target and the fake queries should be similar, so
that the uncertainty h(k) of the search engine about the real target
query is maximum.
3.1.2 Collaborative schemes
Private information retrieval (PIR) protocols were proposed to be used in
scenerios where the database server cooperates. A PIR protocol allows a
user to retrieve a certain item from a database without the latter learning
what item is being acquired. Trivially, PIR can be achieved by sending
a copy of the entire database to the user, but this is very inefficient and
infeasible in practice.
The first PIR protocol was proposed in 1997 by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz
and Sudan [19, 20]. However, it requires the existence of at least two copies of
the same database. Besides, those databases cannot communicate between
19
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them. Accordingly, this proposal cannot work in a single server scenario like
WSE.
Two years later, Kushileviz and Ostrovsky [60] presented the first single-
database PIR scheme. Nevertheless, it requires the cooperation of the
database. This fact represents a major drawback which disqualifies it in
scenarios where the database is not willing to collaborate. WSEs are an
example of this situation: they have no motivation to protect the privacy of
users.
For the above reason, it seems that relaxing the PIR assumptions is needed
for the sake of practicality. We next review some other methods where users
collaborate between them in order to reach the same purpose.
Crowds [86, 87] is a system based on the concept of users blending into a
crowd. In this scheme, a user tries to hide her actions within the actions of
many others. Like Tor, it is based on the mixing system of Chaum [17], but
in this case, the users also act as routers. This proposal works as follows: a
certain user who wants to submit a query can send it directly to the WSE or
she can forward it to one of her neighbours in the crowd. A neighbour who
receives a query can submit it to the WSE or she can forward it again to one
of her own neighbours. A query is forwarded between users until someone
submits it to the WSE. There are some shortcomings in this framework
proposal:
• Like in the anonymity networks, Crowds only protects the data trans-
port. Users are responsible for hiding their private information.
• Personalization is only possible if the members of the crowd share the
same interests.
• The authors argue that Crowds can scale without limits: the load
on each user stays approximately constant as the crowd size grows,
although this can not be guaranteed. Moreover, The structure of the
crowd must be maintained and this task is costly.
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• This proposal requires a central node which manages the crowd (users
joining/leaving the crowd).
• In order to keep a certain user concealed, her queries have to be uni-
formly distributed among the rest of the users [99]. This scheme does
not address this point.
With the same practical spirit, the system described in [27] cloaks a user in
an anonymous peer-to-peer (P2P) user community. A user submits queries
on behalf of her anonymous peers and conversely. Pairs of users in the P2P
community share symmetric encryption keys which are used to establish
confidential channel. In this way, the database still learns which item is
being retrieved (which deviates from strict PIR), but it cannot obtain the
real query histories of users, which become diffused among the peer users.
The resulting relaxation is named user-private information retrieval (UPIR).
The same authors in [28] present an evolution of [27] which uses shared
memory sectors to store and read the queries and their answers. In this
way, there is no connection between users. The authors argue that a wiki-
like collaborative environment can be used to implement a shared memory
sector. This scheme has the following drawbacks: (i) there is no study about
the memory-space requirements of this proposal; (ii) users must scan their
shared memory sectors at regular intervals, and this introduces a significant
overhead to the network; and (iii) this scheme achieves a response time of
5.84 seconds without considering the network time. Thus, the final response
time is expected to be clearly above 5.84 seconds but the exact value is not
specified by the authors.
A method that only exposes a part of the user profile is presented in [110].
This scheme extracts the interests of the user from her browsing history and
emails. All the collected information is organized following a hierarchical
tree where the leaves are the specific interests. Only the general interests
are shown to the WSE. The authors argue that this behavior provides a fair
search quality and a certain level of privacy to the user. Nevertheless, the
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WSE can still create a user profile with her general interests. In addition,
this proposal requires certain modifications at server side, hence it is not
suitable for all the WSEs.
In [14], the Useless User Profile (UUP) protocol is proposed. In this scheme,
every user who wants to submit a query will not send her own query but
a query of another one instead. Users do not know which query belongs
to each user, hence the privacy of users is preserved. Confidentiality is
achieved by means of certain cryptographic tools (a threshold cryptosystem
and a ciphertext re-masking operation). This scheme has been tested in a
real environment and it provides an overhead of 5.2 seconds with a group of
three users and a key length of 1024 bits. The shortcomings of this proposal
are the following:
• This scheme requires a central node which creates the groups of users.
The process of creating groups introduces a significant delay as it re-
quires a large number of users in order to provide an acceptable re-
sponse time.
• It does not consider the trade-off between the privacy level achieved
and the quality of the service.
The scheme proposed in [108] uses the same principle as Crowds [86]: users
submitting queries on behalf of other users. An attractive feature of this
system is that an existing social network (e.g Facebook) can be used as
a peer community. This fact makes its deployment quite straightforward.
Another benefit from the use of social networks is that users who share the
same group are intended to be friends in real life. This implies that they
are likely to share similar interests, hence, the distorted profiles still allow
users to get a proper service from the WSE [72]. Besides, this contribution
improves former proposals in terms of query delay. Nevertheless, this scheme
presents some drawbacks that are summarized below.
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• This scheme relies on two functions in order to work properly. The
first function estimates the profile exposure level and selects who is
the user that must send a certain query in order to preserve the pri-
vacy of users. The second function evaluates the selfishness of the
users and punishes the users who do not collaborate with the group.
The most effective these functions are, the better the system behaves.
However, the authors do not provide a deep study of these functions
and they leave its design as future work. Therefore, achieving better
implementations of both functions is of paramount importance.
• The authors have simulated their scheme and they have demonstrated
its functionality in the environment proposed by them. Nevertheless,
this scheme should be analyzed when dealing with real data in order
to gauge the real privacy level achieved by this solution. In addition,
some measurement functions are needed to evaluate the levels achieved
by the proposed protocol in terms of: privacy, protection against self-
ish users, usability and quality. Without a standard measurement
function, it is not possible to argue whether a certain scheme works
properly or not.
3.2 Server-side disclosure control techniques
Once WSEs have gathered the users’ queries, they assume the corporate
social responsibility of preserving the privacy of their users. Accordingly, in
order to make the most of the collected data, WSEs should anonymize the
data taking care to minimize the information loss (IL).
In the literature, we can find several approaches dealing with the query log
anonymization problem based on query removal or hashing. In [21] a survey
of these naive methods is given. First, some systems simply remove old query
sets assuming that user logs will not be large enough to enable identity
disclosure [15]. This simple criterion hardly preserves privacy in front of
highly identifying queries. A more appropriate approach suggests deleting
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only infrequent queries [1], assuming that those are more likely to refer to
identifying or quasi-identifying information. This is, however, challenging
due to the difficulty of setting deletion thresholds and due to the fact that
the vast majority of queries occur a small number of times [11], which may
result in eliminating a substantial amount of non-identifying queries.
Other removal-based methods focus on removing identifying data (e.g. IP
addresses) associated to queries and/or identifying/private information found
within queries (e.g. SS numbers, credit cards, addresses, etc.) [16]. How-
ever, as discussed above, the combination of the remaining no-identifying
data (i.e. quasi-identifiers) may end with disclosure identity, like in the case
of the infamous AOL incident. In a different approach inspired in secret
sharing methods, Adar [1] proposes to split user queries, assigning them to
fictional user ids. This, however, limits the usability of results, thus inval-
idating the conclusions extracted by a horizontal analysis of queries (e.g.
user profiling methods) [46]. Finally, other systems rely on the application
of hashing functions to identifying information (e.g. IP address) and/or
to queries themselves [59]. Even though this makes the identity disclosure
difficult, it also requires from revealing hashing functions to parties will-
ing to perform query analysis. Moreover, some works have also shown the
ineffectiveness of hash-based schemes, such as token-based hashing [59].
More elaborated approaches [57, 82] remove only those queries that result in
clicking common URLs, assuming that those may be dependent (i.e. quasi-
identifiers). Poblete et al. [82] represent query logs as a graph in which
nodes are queries and two nodes are connected by one edge if the intersec-
tion of their clicked URLs sets is not empty. In particular, they propose a
graph disconnection heuristic focused on the elimination of queries (and the
corresponding edges). The complete anonymization process is iterative and
encompasses the removal of (i) all vulnerable queries, i.e. all queries that
return less than k documents (over-restrictive queries) and queries that con-
tain the target URL or at least the site of the URL as a keyword (well-target
queries), (ii) those returning documents from less than K sites and (iii) all
queries that contribute to a nonzero density of the query graph. The density
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of the graph is the likelihood of finding an edge among any two nodes. The
method stops when the value of density is zero. Korolova et al. [57] propose
to generate a private query click graph. In a nutshell, for every user of the
query log, it keeps only the first d queries posed by the user. This step
limits users’ activity. Then, for each remaining query qi which appears ni




i is ni plus a random
variable drawn independently from the Laplace distribution with mean zero.
The remaining queries are considered safe to publish. Although the method
has several parameters, the authors provide some indications and lemmas to
compute them according to the parameter d. Even though both approaches
focus on the removal of the most informative queries, the obvious drawback
is that their utility is completely lost [21].
More recent approaches rely on SDC methods to anonymize query logs while
minimizing the amount of query removal [73, 47]. To do so, they group
similar users together (according to the similarity of their query logs), and
then their queries are replaced by a prototype query log, thus becoming
indistinguishable. In this manner, users and queries are preserved, even
though the latter are transformed to minimize the disclosure risk.
Semantics have been scarcely considered in related works. The pioneer work
by Terrovitis et al. [102] deals with textual set-valued data proposing gen-
eralizations of input values according to ad hoc constructed Value General-
isation Hierarchies (VGH), which iteratively generalize input values up to a
common node. Authors generalize groups of input queries to a common con-
ceptual abstraction (e.g. sailing and swimming → water sports), until users
who performed those queries become indistinguishable (i.e. k-anonymous).
Due to the dimensionality and unbounded nature of query logs, which makes
the construction of ad hoc VGH unfeasible, authors in [46] propose to
anonymize the set of queries made by a user by generalizing the queries
using WordNet [70]. WordNet is a generic lexical database of the English
language, where concepts are interlinked by means of conceptual-semantic
and lexical relations. The problem of relying in WordNet when facing the
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anonymization of query logs is that the query introduced by the user can
be meaningless in a generic dictionary, despite the fact that they might
not be in English. We think that better results can be obtained for query
logs by gathering semantic information from the Open Directory Project
(ODP), whose its main purpose is precisely to serve as a catalog of the Web
by providing a content-based categorization or classification of Web pages.
Nevertheless, we need to introduce novel approaches to make the informa-
tion obtained from ODP useful. Unlike WordNet, which already has lots
of published and tested distance functions, or aggregation operations, ODP
lacks this extensive previous work.
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As we stated in Chapter 1, once personal data are gathered, users can do
nothing to prevent the WSEs from using them for commercial purposes.
Therefore, users should employ privacy-preserving mechanisms which pre-
vent WSEs from profiling them in a detailed way. In addition, if users
anonymize their own profiles in a proper way, their privacy will be properly
preserved even if the data are disseminated.
However, remember that WSEs collect and store information about their
users in order to tailor their services to their users’ needs. Thus, there is a
trade-off between the privacy level achieved and the quality of the service. If
the user desires a high degree of privacy, she will probably receive a deficient
service. If the user desires an accurate service, her privacy will probably be
jeopardized. Our objective is to provide a mechanism which obfuscates users’
profiles in a way that they remain useful to provide an accurate service while
minimizing the disclosure risks.
The review of the current proposals in the literature shows that the work
presented in [108] offers unique and very interesting features:
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• It uses existing social networks in order to provide already-generated
groups of users.
• These fixed groups are made of friends in real life. Therefore, the
users of a certain group are very likely to share similar interests. As a
result, [108] generates a distorted profile which is a trade-off between
the privacy level achieved and the quality of the service.
• It outperforms the rest of proposals in the literature in terms of query
delay. A system that provides a small query delay is more likely to be
used by the users.
Nevertheless, the following research questions appear when considering this
scheme:
• The privacy level achieved by the users of this proposal depends on
the function that calculates the probability of submitting a query. Can
this function be re-designed to improve the current results?
• Mechanisms to measure the privacy level achieved by the users are
needed in order to compare different proposals. Is there a standard
measure that can be used for this purpose?
• The simulations which are shown in [108] have been performed us-
ing synthetic queries (queries which are generated at random by a
computer) and each user is always submitting the same one towards
the WSE. Will the use of real queries (queries which are generated
by humans) influence the behavior of this scheme in terms of privacy
protection?
4.2 Contribution
A collaborative system to preserve the privacy of WSEs’ users is proposed.
Specifically, we improve the scheme presented in [108]. The main contribu-
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tions are next summarized:
• The function used to decide which user must submit a certain query
to the WSE has been studied and re-designed. As a result, the privacy
level achieved by the users has improved.
• A new measure to estimate the privacy achieved by the users, the
Profile Exposure Level (PEL), is proposed.
• For the first time - to the best of our knowledge - the tests have been
performed using real data extracted from the AOL file [4]. In this
way, the correct behavior of the proposed system has been tested with
queries which have been generated by real users.
These changes improve the privacy achieved by the users in the previous ver-
sion while keeping its usability. The protocol submits standard queries to
the WSE, so it requires neither changes at the server side nor the collabora-
tion of the server with the users. The system is based on the two following
assumptions: (i) due to the flat-rate broadband connection proliferation,
users (their computers) are most of the day connected to the Internet; and
(ii) users are organized in social networks.
The following sections are organized as follows: Section 4.3 presents our
proposal in detail. The measurement methods which have been used are
explained in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. Section 4.7 presents the simulation
results and they are compared with the results achieved by [108]. Finally,
some conclusions are given in section 4.8.
4.3 Protocol for protecting the privacy of the users
The proliferation of flat-rate broadband connections enables users to be con-
nected to the Internet most of the day. More specifically, the use of mobile
devices with communication capabilities (e.g. iphone, htc, blackberry...)
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allows users to be online most of the time, receiving the latest tweets or
facebook messages among others. This fact paves the way to new applica-
tions like Peer-to-Peer (P2P) [3]. In a P2P environment, users collaborate
between them to perform a particular service. Crowds [86] and P2P-PIR [27]
are two examples where the user profile is obfuscated within a group profile.
These schemes do not overload the network but require the maintenance
of the network structure. In order to solve this threat, existing structures
are used: Social Networks. More specifically, the social network concept,
which is explained in [24], is followed. This approach does not require the
existence of a central node. Therefore, users are connected directly between
them or by means of other users who act as intermediaries. Besides, these
social networks are not open to examination (a user only knows her direct
connections in the network).
The users of a social network are connected to similar users with common
interests [72]. Accordingly, a group of users who are maintained by a social
network can be used to create a usable user profile. Note that WSEs need
usable profiles in order to provide a proper service. By using the proposed
protocol, the WSE obtains a profile of each user but this profile is not de-
tailed. In addition, our work is based on social networks that allow users to
know the number of neighbours that a certain neighbour has (only the num-
ber of connections, not the identities behind them). This helps to equitably
distribute all the queries across the network.
Next, the performance of the protocol is briefly described: a user U generates
queries that she can either directly submit to the WSE or she can send to
a neighbour (a neighbour is a direct relationship in the social network). A
neighbour that receives a query can submit it directly to the WSE or she
can forward it again to one of her own neighbours. This process is repeated
until someone submits the query to the WSE. The profile of U is distorted
by the queries that she submits to the WSE, but which are generated by
other users of the social network.
Ideally, all users should behave properly. Nevertheless, this cannot be guar-
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anteed in a real environment. Therefore, two types of users can be defined:
• Selfish user. A selfish user is a user who does not follow the proposed
protocol. When a selfish user wants to submit a query to the WSE,
she sends the query to a neighbour who submits it on her behalf.
However, when a selfish user receives a query from another user, she
systematically discards it and she does not answer.
• Honest user. An honest user is a user who follows the proposed pro-
tocol. When an honest user wants to submit a query to the WSE, she
decides if she submits it directly or if she forwards it to a neighbour
who submits it on her behalf. When the honest user receives a query
from another user, she decides if she submits the query to the WSE
or if she forwards the query to another user.
A selfish behavior prevents the queries from being distributed equitably
among the group. This situation can jeopardize the privacy of the honest
users. Thus, we propose a mechanism to prevent users from behaving in
that way.
4.3.1 The protocol in detail
Supposing that a certain user Ui is a member of a social network and that she
has k neighbours (direct connections) {N1, . . . , Nk}, Ui knows the number
of connections of each of her neighbours. With all this information, Ui can
calculate the sending probability Ps for each neighbour (see Section 4.3.2 for
more details about this probability). Besides, Ui keeps a measure about the
selfishness level of each neighbour (see Section 4.3.5 for more details about
the function that evaluates the selfishness and its parameters).
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When Ui wants to submit a query q to the WSE, she runs the following
protocol:
1. Ui executes the user selection function Ψ(Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk), which returns
a sorted vector ν of users belonging to the group {Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk}. Ui
will use ν to decide whether she submits q to the WSE or she sends q
to a neighbour Nj (see Section 4.3.4 for details about the ordering of
ν and the operations performed by Ψ).
Let Uj be the j-th user belonging to vector ν. Ui can carry out two
actions according to the value of Uj :
(a) If Uj = Ui, then Ui submits q to the WSE.
(b) If Uj ∈ {N1,. . . ,Nk}, then Ui sends q to Uj . Uj can accept or
reject q, hence there are two possible behaviors:
• If Uj rejects q then Ui updates negatively the parameters that
measure the selfishness of Uj (see Section 4.3.5).
• If Uj accepts q then Ui initializes a timer. If the response from
Uj arrives before the end of this timer, Ui updates positively
the parameters that measure the selfishness of Uj . Other-
wise, Ui updates negatively the parameters that measure the
selfishness of Uj (see Section 4.3.5).
This process is repeated until someone accepts q. In case that all the
neighbours reject q, Ui submits her query by herself.
2. Uj executes the selfishness function Υ(Ui) in order to either accept q
or not. Therefore, there are two possible situations:
• If Uj accepts q, then Uj is the new responsible for submitting q.
Thus, Uj repeats the first step of the protocol by replacing the
function Ψ with Ψf (i.e. Ui executes Ψf ). Let Ψf be the function
that decides whether Uj has to either submit q to the WSE or not.
If Ψf answers negatively to that question, Uj attempts to forward
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q to a random neighbour. The aim of Ψf is to distribute the
queries among Uj and her neighbours equitably (see Section 4.3.3
for more details about it). When Uj receives the answer to q (i.e.
from the WSE or from a neighbour), she returns it to Ui.
• If Uj rejects q, then Uj ends her participation and Ui updates
negatively the parameters that measure the selfishness of Uj .
4.3.2 Sending probability Ps
Each user assigns to each one of her neighbours a sending probability Ps in
order to equitably distribute her queries throughout the network.
Let Ui be a user, {N1,. . . ,Nk} be her group of neighbours and {H1,. . . ,Hk}
be the number of neighbours that each neighbour of Ui has (i.e. Hj is the
number of neighbours of Nj). Note that k is the number of neighbours of
Ui. Ui assigns a certain Ps to each neighbour, so that the probability that





4.3.3 Query forward function Ψf
Let Ui be a user and {N1,. . . ,Nk} be her group of neighbours. Function Ψf
determines whether Ui should submit the query q to the WSE or she should
forward it to one of her neighbours. The selection of a certain user within
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4.3.4 User selection function Ψ
Considering a certain user Ui who wants to submit a query q. Ui has the
following list of neighbours: {N1,. . . ,Nk}. Ui executes Ψ in order to decide
which user within {Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk} should submit q to the WSE.
Ui is perfectly concealed when all the members of {Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk} have sub-
mitted the same number of queries generated by Ui [108]. If Ui achieves this
requirement, she will be hidden among the group {Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk}. Thus, she
will achieve a privacy level comparable to k-anonymity [99].
The system uses probability Ps to equitably distribute the queries in a path
of length two, i.e. the source of the queries submits to the WSE the same
number of queries as her neighbours and as the neighbours of her neigh-
bours. This is possible because the number of neighbours and the number
of neighbours of these neighbours are known. Since the complete topology of
the social network is unknown, it is not possible to control the distribution
of queries in paths longer than two. Therefore, more distant neighbours will
submit a small quantity of queries to the WSE. As a result, the true source
of the queries is hidden among a group with a path length of two.
Nevertheless, if the group is known, then, the WSE can obtain certain in-
formation. For example, consider a group of users {Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk}, where
each one has always submitted the same query. In this extreme situation,
the WSE can know the structure of the group and it can be also capable of
determining the direct and indirect (path of length two) connections that a
certain user holds with the other members of the group. If the WSE gathers
all this information, it straightforward finds the centroid of the users who
have sent the same number of queries and can hence identify the source of
the queries.
This weakness is solved by modifying Ps in order to obfuscate the users
within {Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk} adding more distant neighbours. In this way, the
system creates a vector which contains the users {Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk}. Each user
in this vector appears repeated as many times as the number of neighbours
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she has. Ui appears only once. This vector is duplicated a random number
of times. Finally, an interval of vector elements are deleted at random. The
final vector which is obtained through this process is the new Ps.
Let θ be the interval of users which are pruned in order to create vari-
ance in the system. The variance prevents the WSE from calculating a
group centroid. Let Ui be a certain user and {Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk} be the group
of users which have submitted queries from Ui to the WSE. The group
{Ui,N1,. . . ,Nk} is sorted in ascending order by the number of queries from
Ui which they have submitted. If during several executions of the protocol,
the position of Ui in this group remains the same, or very similar, the WSE
could be able to identify the source of the query. Therefore, θ is randomly
chosen between two percentages (these values have been calculated empiri-
cally and are justified in Section 4.7) and it can be recalculated as often as
desired.
4.3.5 Selfishness function Υ(N)
Let U be a user that receives a query q from her neighbour N . U executes
Υ in order to decide whether to accept q or not. The aim of Υ is to punish
the users who behave in a selfish manner.
Initially, U assigns to each neighbour a probability p of accepting queries
from that source. Value p is set to 1.0 (100% of probability) for each neigh-
bour. For notation purposes, pU,N represents the probability of U to accept
a query from N .
Assuming that U receives a query q from user N , U accepts q with proba-
bility pU,N :
• If U accepts q, the following actions are performed:
– N increments her own probability of accepting queries from U :
pN,U = pN,U + (2 · ζ)
35
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
CHAPTER 4. CLIENT-SIDE ANONYMIZATION
Where ζ is a constant defined in the system. Value ζ is calculated
empirically and justified in Section 4.7.
– U decrements her probability of accepting queries from N :
pU,N = pU,N − ζ
Both operations are done to incentivize users to accept queries from
their neighbours. A certain user U who forwards several queries to
the same neighbour N without accepting queries in exchange (selfish
behavior) will finally get a pN,U = 0. If the same situation happens
with all her neighbours, U will be isolated and forced to submit all her
queries to the WSE by her own. An isolated user is able to improve
her situation by accepting queries from her neighbours. By decreasing
ζ for a reject and increasing 2 · ζ for an accept, the protocol punishes
the users that systematically reject all queries instead of the users that
accept and reject queries.
• If U rejects q, the following happens:
– N decrements her own probability of accepting queries from U :
pN,U = pN,U − ζ
We have simulated our scheme for several values of ζ to check out which one
better isolates the selfish users of the system. The best results were achieved
with ζ = 0, 03 (see Section 4.7 for details about the choice of this value).
Therefore, this is the value used hereinafter.
4.3.5.1 Coprivacy
The proposed scheme protects the privacy of the users in communities where
most users are honest. If there is a large quantity of selfish users, the privacy
of honest users would be jeopardized (see Section 4.7 for more details about
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it). On the other hand, selfish users lose their privacy in both scenarios.
Besides, an honest user alone cannot protect her own privacy. Therefore,
honest users do not have any motivation to leave the network, as they need
each other. Regarding the selfish users, if they leave the social network,
the system will work better. If they do not leave the network, they will be
isolated by honest users by using the selfishness function Υ.
The situation where users collaborate in a system to preserve their privacy
is named coprivacy and it was defined in [26]. A protocol is coprivate if the
best option for a player to preserve her privacy is to help another player in
preserving her own privacy.
4.4 Evaluation
The review of the state of the art exposes the features that should be fulfilled
by any system which provides privacy to WSEs’ users. These features are:
privacy, protection against selfish users, usability and quality. Evaluating
a system is based on assessing these four characteristics. In our case, the
optimal values for ζ and θ are the ones that offer better results for these
features.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no standard method to evaluate these
four attributes. Accordingly, we propose the following ones which are later
used to analyze our system:
• Privacy. The user profile must be kept hidden from the WSE. We
propose the Profile Exposure Level (PEL) which uses mutual informa-
tion in order to measure the level of exposure of the user profile (see
Section 4.5).
• Protection against selfish users. If a user behaves in a selfish way she
must be penalized. In our simulations, we use different values of ζ in
order to find out which one performs better against selfish users.
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• Usability. This feature is crucial for the system. A completely secure
scheme that suffers from high query delay will not be used by most
users (see Section 4.6). In our work, the usability is evaluated by using
the average response time of a query.
• Quality. The quality refers to the similarities between the responses
which are gathered using the proposed system and the responses which
are received submitting the queries directly to WSE. Our protocol
submits original queries to the WSE (queries are not modified in any
way). Thus, this feature is not considered in our evaluation.
4.5 Profile Exposure Level
Let ΩX be the real queries of the user and ΩY be the queries sent to the
WSE. Note that ΩX and ΩY can be seen as two random variables X and Y
respectively, which can take so many values as different queries they have
and with probability proportional to the number of repetitions. Accordingly,





where H(X) is the entropy of the original set of queries and I(X,Y ) is the
mutual information between X and Y . PEL measures the percentage of
the user information that is exposed when Y is disclosed. Thus, the user
information is calculated as the entropy of X, and the mutual information
gives a measure of the information that Y provides about X (i.e. if Y is
known, how much does this reduce the uncertainty about X?).
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4.5.1 Mutual Information
Given two random discrete variables X and Y , that have sample spaces ΩX
and ΩY respectively, it can be considered that:
1. The probability function of the variable X is defined by p(x) when,
for all x ∈ ΩX , p(x) = P (X = x).
2. The probability function of the variable Y is defined by p(y) when, for
all y ∈ ΩY , p(y) = P (Y = y).
3. The joint probability function of the variables X and Y are defined by
p(x, y) when, for all x ∈ ΩX and y ∈ ΩY , p(x, y) = P (X = x, Y = y).
4. The probability function of the variable X conditioned on the variable
Y is defined by p(x/y) when, for all x ∈ ΩX and y ∈ ΩY ,
p(x/y) = P (X = x/Y = y).
The mutual information, I(X,Y ), of two random variables X and Y is
a measure that allows us to evaluate the information that each variable
provides about the other. I(X,Y ) shows the amount of uncertainty in X
which is removed by knowing Y . Mathematically, this is expressed as:
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X/Y )
where H(X) is the entropy of the variable X and H(X/Y ) is the conditional
entropy of the variable X, given the variable Y . H(X/Y ) is defined as the





p(x) · log2 p(x)
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H(X/Y ) = −
∑
x,y
p(x, y) · log2 p(x/y)
From the previous expressions we can obtain the following one:
I(X,Y ) = −
∑
x
p(x) · log2 p(x)+
∑
x,y
p(x, y) · log2 p(x/y) =
∑
x,y
p(x, y) · log2
p(x/y)
p(x)




p(x/y) · p(y) · log2
p(x/y)
p(x)
In our scheme, X represents the queries which are originally generated by
the user, i.e. the queries she wants to submit. The variable Y represents




i=1, set with the elements of X (without repetitions).
ΩY = {yi}
r
i=1, set with the elements of Y (without repetitions) .
CX = {cxi}
m
i=1, set with the cardinal of each element of X.
CY = {cyi}
r
i=1, set with the cardinal of each element of Y .
M =
∑m




i=1 cyi , total number of elements of the set Y , counting repeti-
tions.
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Calculation of p(x) and p(y)
Let us suppose that the probability of each element of X and Y is propor-
tional to its cardinal. Then, p(x) and p(y) are computed as follows:
P (X = xi) =
cxi
M
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
P (Y = yi) =
cyi
N
, 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Calculation of p(x/y)
P (X = xi/Y = yj) is calculated for each pair xi, yj where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
1 ≤ j ≤ r.
Fixing yj ∈ Y , the possible situations and their calculations are:
1. yj /∈ X. There is no information, i.e. the probability is randomly
assigned among the elements of X proportionally to the cardinal.
P (X = xi/Y = yj) =
cxi
M
, 1 ≤ and ≤ m.
2. yj ∈ X. Then there exists a xk ∈ X so that xk = yj .
(a) If cyj ≤ cxk , it is assumed that yj comes from xk and not from
any other x ∈ Ωx.
P (X = xk/Y = yj) = 1
P (X = xk′/Y = yj) = 0, 1 ≤ k
′ ≤ m, k 6= k′
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(b) If cyj > cxk , one of the following statements is assumed: (i)
yj comes from xk and not from any other x ∈ Ωx, with the
probability proportional to the cardinal of xk; (ii) there is no
information with probability proportional to the difference of the
cardinals.















, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ m, k 6= k′
4.6 Usability measure
The international standard ISO/IEC 9126 (Software engineering - Product
quality) [50], defines usability as the extent to which a product can be used
by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency,
and satisfaction in a specified context of use. More specifically, we focus on
whether users can easily accomplish intended tasks at their desired speed or
not.
In the proposed scheme, a task is considered to be the process of submitting
a query and receiving the answer. The period of time needed to execute this
process is named response time. Systems based on Tor networks obtain large
response times. For instance, the authors in [90] got an average response
time of 10 seconds. We argue that this time is too long for a web search
system to be usable. Therefore, the objective is to reduce it as much as
possible.
The period of time between the submission of a query to the WSE and the
reception of the answer can be decomposed as follows:
1. The query goes from the user to the WSE.
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2. The WSE processes the query and generates an answer.
3. The answer goes from the WSE to the user.
In our scheme, there is an extra step in which the message is forwarded
between a certain number of users before reaching the WSE. The answer is
returned through the reverse path. Therefore, the average response time of
a query is:
Response time = (2 ·#hops · latency) + timeWSE
Where:
• timeWSE is the time needed by the WSE to answer the query. In
average, this time is 400 ms [108].
• latency is the round-trip time (RTT) between two peers. The study
presented in [18] determines that the average latency between two
random users in a worldwide P2P network is 530 ms.
• hops is the average number of hops that a query performs before reach-
ing the WSE. This value has been obtained from the simulations.
4.7 Simulations
The evaluation of the proposed system has been done by simulating various
social networks between 1.000 and 10.000.000 users. In these networks, each
user is directly connected with a number of users between 1 and 10 following
a power-law distribution [62].
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4.7.1 Tests
The evaluation process includes two different types of tests:
• The first type checks the equitable distribution of messages around
the network. Each user generates a unique query and sends it many
times. This is the worst possible case because all the queries which are
submitted by the same user are equal and different from the queries
sent by other users. As a result, these queries can be easily linked
together. Nevertheless, if the system works correctly, the user who
has generated all these queries remains hidden among the set of users
who have submitted them. This kind of tests use synthetic queries
(queries generated at random by a computer). Besides, the results of
these tests provide the optimal values for ζ (see Section 4.3.5).
• The second type of tests use real queries (queries generated by humans)
in order to evaluate the privacy level achieved by the users. These
queries were extracted from the AOL file [4]. This file shows which
queries were submitted by each AOL user (note that the real identity
of each AOL user is not disclosed, only her queries). In this way, in our
tests, a certain simulated user gets the personality of a certain AOL
user. Therefore, the simulated user only sends the queries which were
generated by her assigned AOL user. Note that each user submits a
different number of queries. Depending on this number, their privacy
might vary.
4.7.2 Privacy
Before evaluating the privacy offered by our proposal, we need to determine
the interval θ of users that are pruned in order to introduce variance to the
system. We run 1.000 tests using social networks of 1.000 users. Table 4.1
shows the average position, variance and deviation of the users with 10
neighbours for different intervals of θ. The highest variance is obtained by
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θ interval Average position Variance Deviation
0% - 0% 5,81 8,34 2,89
80% - 40% 4,36 11,54 3,39
60% - 40% 4,46 11,37 3,37
80% - 20% 4,51 10,71 3,27
80% - 60% 4,51 12,5 3,53
40% - 20% 4,49 10,13 3,18
30% - 10% 4,42 10,12 3,18
30% - 20% 4,46 10,21 3,19
20% - 10% 4,3 9,67 3,11
Table 4.1: Average position, variance and deviation obtained with dif-
ferent θ intervals.
the 80%-60% interval. This is the interval which has been used in the rest
of the simulations.
Figure 4.1 shows the average position and the deviation of the users accord-
ing to the number of neighbours that they have. For a good comparison,
we have included the ideal average position. It can be observed that the
average position does not differ much while the position of the users within
the group obtains a large deviation.
4.7.2.1 Simulation results from scenarios without selfish users
The optimal system behavior is achieved when all users follow the protocol.
We performed tests with 1.000 users from the AOL files [4] to determine the
level of privacy that is achieved in this situation. The Mutual Information
(see Section 4.5.1) returns the entropy reduction in bits. This information
is not useful without the initial uncertainty, hence, we use the percentage of
information that involves the Mutual Information about the initial entropy
as a measure. Hereafter, we consider that a user is exposed when this
percentage is less than 40%, i.e. above 60% of the initial entropy.
Table 4.2 shows the average number of exposed users according to the num-
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Deviation Real median Ideal median
Figure 4.1: The ideal and simulated average position and the deviation
for each number of neighbours.
ber of neighbours they have. We have completed the table with the number
of users who have an uncertainty percentage above 70% and 80%.
Generally, the users with fewer connections are the most exposed ones. How-
ever, there are some users with many connections who also expose their pro-
file to the WSE. This case can occur when the number of queries of these
users is small or when their neighbours have sent them a small number of
queries.
In table 4.3 it can be seen that nearly 90% of the users expose less than 20%
of their profile. Moreover, taking into account that a user is exposed when
at least 60% of her profile has been revealed, more than 95% of the users
preserve their privacy.
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# Neighbours # Exposed 60% # Exposed 70% # Exposed 80%
1 15,4 15,1 4,7
2 12,6 12 4,7
3 5,2 4 1,2
4 4,67 4 2
5 1 1 1
6 1,3 0 0
7 1,2 0 0
8 0 0 0
9 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
41,37 36,1 13,6
Table 4.2: Number of exposed users according to various percentages of
exposure.











Table 4.3: Percentage of similarity between the mutual information and
the initial entropy for the users.
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Table 4.4: Percentage of exposed users for different ζ values.
4.7.2.2 Simulation results from scenarios with selfish users
Before evaluating the privacy offered by the system in front of selfish users,
we have to determine the ζ value which must be applied. The optimal value
is important in order to prevent honest users from jeopardizing their privacy.
We have run 100 tests over social networks of 1.000 users. 10% of these users
were set to behave selfishly. Each user submits her own query 100 times.
Table 4.4 shows the percentage of honest users and selfish users that expose
their profile for several ζ values. It can be observed that the number of
honest users who are exposed grows when ζ is increased. Thus, the optimal
penalty value is 0, 03. This is the value used hereinafter.
In order to evaluate the privacy offered by the system in environments with
selfish users, we run 100 test over various social networks of 1.000 users using
real data.
Figure 4.2 presents the percentage of exposed users for different percentages
of selfish users. Note that, when there are more selfish users, the number of
exposed honest users also grows.
With the above tests we have also calculated the number of queries that a
selfish user submits to the WSE in a system’s execution with real data or
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Honest users Selfish users
Figure 4.2: Percentage of exposed users for different percentages of self-
ish users.
synthetic data. Figure 4.3 shows the results achieved according the number
of neighbours.
4.7.3 Usability
In Section 4.6 we have defined the term usability. In this section, our
target is to obtain the average number of hops. We have performed sev-
eral simulations with social networks of 10.000 users. In each simulation,
each user generates 1.000 queries. The results show that the average num-
ber of hops is 3, 59. Therefore, the average response time of a query is
(2 · 3, 59 · 530 ms) + 400 ms = 4205, 4 ms.
This time is slightly worse than the 3914 ms obtained by [108]. However, the
privacy level achieved by our scheme is significantly better. The controlled
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Figure 4.3: Average number of queries which are submitted by selfish
users.
distribution of queries allows the system to hide the source user among her
social network group with a path of length two.
In table 4.5, it can be observed that the new system achieves larger devia-
tions and average positions closer to the ideal than the previous one.
As we have mentioned before, proposals based on Tor have an average re-
sponse time of 10000 ms with paths of length two. The UUP [14] achieves
a response time of 5200 ms. This is a 20 % worse than the time attained
by our proposal. In addition, our scheme improves the quality of the search
results because it considers the trade-off between the privacy level achieved
and the quality of the service.
Regarding the response time of a direct WSE search, note that this search
method does not protect the privacy of the users. The privacy-protection
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Category position average position Deviation deviation
1 neighbour 0,49 1,01 0,49 0,01
2 neighbours 0,97 1,08 0,87 0,08
3 neighbours 1,44 1,68 1,22 0,72
4 neighbours 1,89 2,11 1,55 0,95
5 neighbours 2,34 3,23 1,89 1,21
6 neighbours 2,78 3,95 2,21 1,55
7 neighbours 3,23 5,15 2,52 2,15
8 neighbours 3,64 6,32 2,83 2,41
9 neighbours 4,12 7,30 3,09 2,40
10 neighbours 4,51 7,00 3,51 2,91
Table 4.5: Average position and deviation obtained with our system and
its previous version [108].
process represents a cost for the users. They should consider whether their
privacy deserves this cost or not.
4.8 Conclusions
We have described a new version of the protocol presented in [108], which
preserves the privacy of the users by distorting their profiles. The new
version improves the privacy achieved by the users, maintaining its usability.
In [108], the privacy of a certain user U who is generating certain queries is
obtained by concealing her into a group Y of k users. This group is formed
by the users who have submitted the queries generated by U . The users in Y
are ordered according to the number of queries that each one has submitted
to the WSE.
The authors of this work state that the WSE can identify U if her position
in the ordered group Y is always the same. According to that, U should
ideally be situated in the middle of Y , but the deviation of this position
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should be high. A high deviation implies that it is difficult for the WSE to
ascertain the exact position of U in Y . Thus, the WSE cannot identify U .
Therefore, in order to compare both protocols we have calculated the average
position and deviation achieved by our system and we have compared those
results with the results attained by the former protocol [108]. Results show
that the privacy level achieved by our scheme is significantly better.
In addition to that, as there is a lack of standard measures to evaluate the
privacy achieved by the users in this type of systems, we have proposed a new
measure: the Profile Exposure Level (PEL). PEL measures the percentage
of the personal information that is exposed when a certain user submits her
queries to the WSE. This measure can be used by any entity that knows
which queries have been generated by the user and which queries have been
submitted by the user. Therefore, each user can compute her own PEL
because she knows this information.
Also, for the first time - to the best of our knowledge - the tests have
been performed using real queries (queries generated by humans) which
were extracted from AOL’s files. Former proposals in the literature used
synthetic queries (queries generated by computers) to test their behavior.
From the validity point of view, our approach is more accurate and hence
the results of our simulations are trustworthy.
We have simulated the performance of the proposal and the results show
that it can be successfully deployed in real environments because: (i) it
provides an acceptable query delay; (ii) it offers privacy to users who have
a reasonable number of direct connections; and (iii) it works properly in
scenarios with users who do not follow the protocol.
Nevertheless, our proposal has only been tested on simulated social net-
works. Real social networks (e.g. Facebook, Windows live messenger...)
have not been considered in our evaluation process. Therefore, we can-
not assume that the results would be exactly the same in a real network.
However, we consider than the behavior should be quite similar since the
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simulation process has been realized trying to replicate a real environment.
4.8.1 Publications
• A. Erola, J. Castellà-Roca, A. Viejo and J.M. Mateo-Sanz, Exploting
Social Networks to Provide Privacy in Personalized Web Search, Jour-
nal of Systems and Software, Vol. 84, no. 10, pp. 1734-17445, Oct
2011, ISSN: 0164-1212
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A query or search log from a WSE is composed of lines of the form:
(id, q, t, r, u)
where id is the user identifier, q is the query string, t is a timestamp, u is the
URL clicked by the user after the query, and r is the position in the results
ranking of the clicked URL. This format corresponds to logs released by AOL
in 2006. Figure 5.1 shows some real logs from AOL data. The information
provided in these logs is the same as the logs from AllTheWeb [51], and it
closely resembles other released data from Excite [53] or AltaVista [52]. It
is normally considered as a generic query log format.
For our work we have used the AOL query logs. As other released query
logs, we have to bear in mind that they have already been anonymized using
basic techniques. Thus, the clicked URL is truncated to the domain name
before publishing it, as a minor privacy measure. We can also assume that
private information from the query terms such as social security numbers
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24963762 myspace codes 2006-05-31 23:00:52 2 http://www.myspace-codes.com
24964082 bank of america 2006-05-31 19:41:07 1 http://www.bankofamerica.com
24967641 donut pillow 2006-05-31 14:08:53
24967641 dicontinued dishes 2006-05-31 14:29:38
24969374 orioles tickets 2006-05-31 12:31:57 2 http://www.greatseats.com
24969374 baltimore marinas 2006-05-31 12:43:40
Figure 5.1: Example of search query log.
has been removed [109].
The user identifier (id) is a unique identifier for each user. This identi-
fier can be obtained directly by the WSE, where the user needs to log in,
or indirectly by, for example, a combination of the URL, user agent, and
cookies of the user from the Web server access logs. The user identifier is
normally anonymized by a simple hash function or a similar approach. It has
been shown that, even using such anonymization, users can be identified [7].
Moreover, hashing techniques, applied to the query terms, are vulnerable to
frequency analysis [59].
5.2 Search logs release
The release of search logs is related to the microdata release (see Section 2.3)
yet quite different. Unlike relational databases, query logs do not constitute
well-defined sets of attributes, since several subsets of queries could play
the role of quasi-identifiers. Moreover, query logs have variable length and
high dimensionality, compared to the relatively few attributes and values
in relational records. Finally, query logs are expressed in free text, so they
can almost take any possible value of any domain, whereas attributes in
relational databases are usually either numerical or categorical.
This unbounded nature of queries make it difficult to detect the potentially
identifying information. Several authors [1, 55, 82] have discussed this is-
sue. Hence, although query logs can be submitted to an anonymization
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process prior to their publication, there is no absolute guarantee of privacy
protection.
We propose the application of microaggregation to anonymize search logs.
This approach ensures a high degree of privacy, providing k-anonymity at
user level, and preserves some of the data usefulness. To optimize the mi-
croaggregation, partition and aggregation operators that minimize the in-
formation loss must be defined.
In the next three sections we propose three different microaggregation meth-
ods specifically desinged to minimize the information loss of released search
logs. For each method, evaluation, results and conclusions are presented.
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5.3 Microaggregation of search logs
In this section we present a technique to ensure k-anonymity in search logs by
means of microaggregation, without having to explicitly remove any query
from the log (although they are somehow perturbed). If there are k indis-
tinguishable users, it is not feasible to re-identify users as in the case of the
released logs from AOL [7] for some given k.
Each user of a search log can be represented by a simple ordered tree, group-
ing all its queries. Figure 5.2 shows the representation of the users from the
query logs of Table 5.1. All requests in the query log belonging to the same
user are treated as a single record in the protection process.
id query string timestamp rank clicked URL
id0 (µ0, µ1) t0 r0 u0
id0 (µ0, µ2) t1 r1 u1
id0 (µ1, µ2, µ3) t2 r2 u2
id0 (µ1) t3 r3 u2
id1 (µ4, µ0, µ1) t4 r4 u4
id1 (µ1) t5 r5 u5
Table 5.1: Example of queries.
{t0, r0, u0} {t1, r1, u1} {t2, r2, u2} {t3, r3, u3} {t4, r4, u4}
id0 id1
µ0 µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4µ0 µ1 µ2 µ1 µ0 µ1
{t5, r5, u5}
µ1
Figure 5.2: Example of user query trees.
As we will show, our proposal aggregates different users to achieve user k-
anonymity, which results in the loss of some information for each individual
in the protected data. Achieving privacy in these scenarios always presents
a trade-off between privacy and utility. In our case, we will show that even
achieving a high degree of privacy, the data still preserve enough utility to
be used in data mining processes.
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The rest of the section is organized as follows. In Section 5.3.1 we present the
microaggregation of the query logs. Section 5.3.2 provides the evaluation of
our proposal both in terms of privacy and usability, and finally, Section 5.4.5
discusses the key findings.
5.3.1 Microaggregation of query logs
In order to reduce excessive information loss resulting from query removal,our
proposal will be based on data microaggregation (see Section 2.4). To max-
imize the utility of anonymized data, similar records should be clustered
together, so that the information loss resulting from the replacement by
their centroid can be minimized. However, remember that finding the opti-
mal data partition is NP-hard [78] in general. Hence, we propose to use the
approximantion algorithm MDAV(see Section 2.5).
The application of MDAV to query logs of the form shown in Figure 5.2 is
not straighforward, since we need to define a proper distance function for
the partition step of the microaggregation and an aggregation operator to
be used in the aggregation step.
5.3.1.1 Distance and aggregation of query logs
We will denote the user query tree for a given user idi as:
q(idi) = (idi, ϕ
i)






, . . .) is the vector of queries for user idi. That is,











j = (µ0, µ1, µ2, . . .) is the query string (search terms
used in the query). We will also use |ϕi| as the number of queries for user
idi, and |φ
i
j | as the number of terms (words) in the query j of user idi.
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A previous step to the microaggregation is the normalization of the numeric
data: timestamp, rank, number of queries per user, and number of terms
per query. In general, given an attribute A with maximum value max(A)
and minimum value min(A) in the original log, the normalization of xi
(the original values) and denormalization of x′i (the protected values) for
all xi ∈ A, and x
′
i ∈ A







The normalized number of queries for user idi is denoted as |ϕi|, and the
normalized number of terms in the query ϕij as |φ
i
j |.
5.3.1.2 User query distance
The distance is calculated as the aggregation of several distance functions
for each pair of user queries. We define the distance functions used as:
• deuclid(x, y) =
√
(x− y)2: Euclidean distance will be used for the rank.
• dt(ti, tj): distance between two timestamps t1, t2, as the Euclidean
distance of the UNIX epoch representation of the timestamps.
• du(ui, uj): distance between two domain names (the clicked URL).
Given two domain names: X = xn. . . . .x0, and Y = ym. . . . .y0, and






where wi = 2
m−i/(2m−1) and αi = 0 if xi = yi (case-insensitive string
equality) or 1 otherwise. That is, du is a weighted mean of αi. Note
that we consider that the right-most part of the domain name is more
relevant.
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• dlev(x, y): the normalized Levenshtein or edit distance between two
strings x, y. The distance calculates the minimum number of edits
(insertion, deleteion, or substitution) needed to convert one string into
the other. The value is then normalized by the maximum length of
the strings.
• dφ(φi, φj): distance between two query strings (the terms introduced







(|φi| − |φj |)2 + dH(φi, φj)
)
(5.1)
where dH is the Hausdorff distance defined in the metric space (µ, dlev),






, . . .}, and the edit distance is used to compare the words.
Thus
dH(φ1, φ2) = max(IH(φ1, φ2), IH(φ2, φ1)) (5.2)
where





Note that dφ considers the similarity of the words between the query
strings relying in the edit distance, but also takes into account the
size of the query in number of words, something that the Hausdorff
distance does not measure.
• dϕ(ϕi, ϕj): distance between two single queries of the form ϕi =




(dt(t1, t2), deuclid(r1, r2), du(u1, u2), 3·dφ(φ1, φ2)) (5.3)
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where dH is the Hausdorff distance in the metric space (ϕ, dϕ), where ϕ is
the set of all queries ϕi.
Note that we consider the number of queries of both users and the similarity
of the set of queries between the users. The purpose of the distance is to
form clusters of similar users, that is, users with a similar profile of search
queries.
5.3.1.3 Comments on the distance function
We have chosen the distance functions attempting to provide the more
straightforward measure for each part. Numeric values use Euclidean-based
distances, which are widely used and accepted in continuous data protec-
tion methods (especially in statistical disclosure control). The distance for
domain names, clearly weights the most relevant part of the domain name.
This distance was successfully applied to the anonymization of access logs
from Web servers [74].
The query strings distance from Eq. (5.1) is more elaborated. It first com-
putes the Hausdorff distance between the set of terms of each query using the
Levenshtein distance between terms (strings) as shown in Eq. (5.2). Since
the Hausdorff distance does not take into account the number of elements
in each set, we have also introduced a measure of the number of terms,
computing the Euclidean distance between the normalized number of terms
of each query. Also note that the Hausdorff distance has more weight than
the distance between number of queries (double weight). As we consider
that the similarity of the string itself is more important than the length of
the query. Moreover, when we consider the distance between single queries
in Eq. (5.3), the distance between the query strings has more weight, thus
prevailing over the the other parts.
A similar approach is used to compute the final distance between two users
in Eq. (5.4), where we use the Hausdorff distance between the set of queries
of each user and also consider the distance between the number of queries
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of each user. In this case both measures have the same weight. The number
of queries is in this case more relevant due to the aggregation process that
will be described in Section 5.3.1.4. Aggregating users with very different
number of queries will result in higher information loss.
Finally, it is important to remark that the objective of the distance function
is to group similar users, or users with the same search profile, together.
Nevertheless, a very relevant part is the distance between the terms of the
queries, which at the end relies on the Levenshtein or edit distance. This
distance only takes into account syntactic similarities and does not actually
consider the semantics of the queries. Thus, our method can be seen as user
anonymization and protection at syntactic level. A semantic approach could
lead to other interesting results which are to be explored.
5.3.1.4 User query aggregation
To find the centroid of a cluster of user queries, we compute their aggregation
(C) as the aggregation of each part of the user queries:
C(q(id1), . . . , q(idk)) = (id
′,Cϕ(ϕ
1, . . . , ϕk))
where, id′ is a temporary identifier for the centroid that will be replaced by
the original user id in the protected dataset. And the aggregation of queries
Cϕ is defined as:
Cϕ(ϕ
1, . . . ϕk) = Cϕ
(
(ϕ11, . . . , ϕ
1
|ϕ1|), . . . , (ϕ
k





= (ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ
∗
|ϕ∗|)
The centroid ϕ∗ is composed of queries from the cluster queries ϕi for i =
{1 . . . k}. For each original query vector ϕi, that is, all queries from user i,
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These queries, ϕ∗,i = (ϕ∗,i
1
, . . . , ϕ∗,i
|ϕ∗,i|
), are such that preserve the frequency
of query strings from the original query ϕi. That is, in a more formal way,
given a frequency function f on query strings, we require that,










= ϕj if the query string of both queries are equal, that is, if and
only if φi = φj .
The other parts of the query are aggregated by using the arithmetic mean
for the rank and the timestamp, and generalizing the URL to the rightmost
common part (sub-domain).
5.3.2 Evaluation
To evaluate our proposal we have tested the microaggregation of real data
from the AOL logs released in 2006, which corresponds to the queries per-
formed by 650 000 users over three months. For our tests, we randomly
select 1000 users from the logs, which correspond to 55 666 lines of query
logs.
In the following sections we measure the privacy achieved by our method,
and the utility of the protected data. We also evaluate the utility of the
protected data in data mining processes, and provide an analysis of the
frequency of queries and words.
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5.3.2.1 Profile Exposure Level
For each user id we have her original set of queries ϕ and the corresponding
protected ones ϕ′, which have been protected by means of our microaggrega-
tion method. Note that ϕ and ϕ′ can be seen as two random variables, which
can take so many values as different queries they have and with probability

























# users forming group
PEL k−anonymity
Figure 5.3: The average PEL for k ∈ {2, . . . , 10}.
In order to verify that our method protects the users’ queries obtaining
k-anonymity, we have used the Profile Exposure Level (see Section 4.5).
PEL measures the percentage of the user information that is exposed when
ϕ′ is disclosed. Thus, the user information is calculated as the entropy of
ϕ, and the mutual information gives a measure of the information that ϕ′
provides about ϕ, i.e. when ϕ′ is known, how it reduces the uncertainty
about ϕ. So, if we divide the I(ϕ, ϕ′) by H(ϕ) we obtain the percentage
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of information that attackers can deduce of ϕ by means of ϕ′. In order to
protect the users’ privacy, the percentage should be as low as possible.
We have microaggregated the 1000 users from the AOL logs for k ∈ {2, . . . , 50}.
Then we have computed PEL for each user and value of k.
Figure 5.3 shows the theoretical level of privacy for k = {2, . . . , 10}, i.e. the
k-anonimity, and the average of the PEL obtained. Thus, we can see that
our method offers k-anonymity, since the theoretical and the PEL obtained
experimentally are very close.
5.3.2.2 Information loss
The first usability measure for categorical data was presented in [31]. The
authors proposed an entropy-based measure to evaluate the information loss
in SDC. In the same line, [63] proposed to measure the information loss as:
ILR =
|original entropy − new entropy|
original entropy
· 100
We have used the ILR (Information Loss Ratio) to evaluate the utility of
our proposal with the same files obtained previously when we calculated
PEL. Thus, we have 1000 users and their original queries, and for every
k ∈ {2, . . . , 50} the protected queries for every user. Figure 5.4 shows that
the data utility broke down according to the parameter k of the microag-
gregation. It can be observed that when k increases (the number of user
per cluster thus increases), the information loss of the user also grows. Note
that minor fluctiations are due to small and expected perturbations in the
microaggregation process.
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Figure 5.4: The average ILR for k ∈ {2, . . . , 50}.
5.3.2.3 On the relation of PEL and IRL
PEL and ILR help us to establish a trade-off between privacy and usefulness
of the data (information loss).
By using a greater k, we have a high information loss (ILR), as we can see
in Figure 5.4. For k = 35 we lose the 50% of the users’ information, and
for k = 3 we lose only the 10%. The minimum ILR provides the most data
utility, so we should select the smallest values of k.
Nonetheless, as it is shown in Figure 5.3, greater k offers more privacy to the
users, i.e. their profiles are less exposed. For instance, when k = 2, 50% of
the user’s profile is exposed, and for k = 10 only the 10% is exposed. From
the privacy point of view, greater k would be recommendable to protect the
privacy of the users. However, we consider that a user’s profile has enough
protection if PEL is at least of 40%, i.e. k = 3 (see [39]).
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Thus, we can conclude that the optimal k for the microaggregation is k = 3,
because we obtain a reasonable privacy level (PEL) and a low information
loss (ILR).
Note also that the number of records for each user is not very relevant, since
all measures and operations are based on percentages. Obviously, users with
an extremely low number of queries (one, or two) will lose a lot of information
(close to 100%) in the protected version. Nevertheless, this won’t affect the
overall results in normal situations. Recall that we are dealing with real
data from the AOL search engine, where the number of queries per user is
relatively large [80].
5.3.2.4 Utility in data mining
Query logs are normally used in data mining processes for their analysis.
To evaluate the utility of our protection method in data mining, we have
considered clustering as a generic data minig process. There are several data
mining techniques, from which clustering is one of the most popular [9, 10,
5]. Although the clustering of query logs is normally performed with some
customized and more elaborated clustering, we show our results in a simple
clustering just to give a generic idea.
We have compared the clustering of protected data with the clustering of
the original data. We have used the k-means algorithm to cluster user
query logs relying on the distance and aggregation functions described in
Sections 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.4.
To compare the clusters obtained in the original data and the protected
data, we have used two different well known indexes: the Jaccard index,
and the Rand index.
We denote the partition of the original data as Π, and the partition of the
protected data as Π′. Let Π = {πi, . . . , πn} and Π
′ = {π′
1
, . . . , π′n} (both
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partitions have the same number of clusters). We define r, s, t, and u as
the number of pairs of elements (a, b) such that:
• r: a and b are in the same cluster in Π and Π′;
• s: a and b are in the same cluster in Π but not in Π′;
• t: a and b are in the same cluster in Π′ but not in Π;
• u: a and b are in different clusters in Π and Π′;








r + s+ t+ u
Figure 5.5 shows the Jaccard and Rand indexes comparing the original data
with the data protected with k ∈ {3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50}, using the k-means
algorithm with κ = {2 . . . 500}. We use κ to denote the k parameter of the
k-means algorithm, which corresponds to the number of clusters. As the
number of clusters increases, the indexes are closer to 1, meaning that both
partitions are very similar. Regardless of the k used in the microaggregation
process, we obtain similar results for both indexes.
More interesting is to see the differences between the indexes as the microag-
gregation k is incremented. As noted in Sections 5.3.2.1, and 5.3.2.2, as this
k increments, we achieve more privacy but less utility. Given a protected
dataset with k = 3 and another with k = 50, Figure 5.6 shows the differ-
ence between the clusters of the two datasets, as the k-means κ increases.
The straigh line denotes de difference between the Jaccard index of both
datasets, and the doted line denotes the difference between the Rand index.
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Figure 5.5: Rand and Jaccard indexes for aggregated data with k ∈
{3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50}.
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However, the values for the indexes in Figure 5.5 seem similar. We can see
in Figure 5.6 that the differences between the same index but for the two
different values of k (3 and 50) decrements as the k-means κ increases. This
means that if we are going to cluster data in the data mining process with
relatively big κ, we can use a relatively big k in the microaggregation. That
is, we can provide high privacy protection to the data while preserving the





 50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450  500
cluster size
Jaccard Rand
Figure 5.6: Difference of the Jaccard and Rand indexes for data mi-
croaggregated with k = 3 and k = 50.
Note that we are clustering users (or user profiles) using the same user dis-
tance used in the microaggregation process. This anticipates that the rela-
tively good results were expected from how the protected log is generated.
We think that this is the main reason that makes microaggregation a good
protection technique for privacy-preserving data mining when a distance-
based clustering is used in the data mining process. The example described
here is just an exemplification of this statement. Some particular data min-
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ing applications where our protection method will provide good results are
in fact those making use of some clustering technique: categorization, clas-
sification, . . .
5.3.2.5 Frequency analysis
We have also analyzed the frequency of queries in the protected data. Fig-
ure 5.7 shows the frequency of the ten most popular queries in the original
data, and their evolution in the protected data as the microaggregation k
































Figure 5.7: Query frequency analysis.
Although there are variations in the frequency, they are very low. Most
relevant is the fact that in all the protected data the same 10 queries are
the 10 most popular, with some minor exceptions.
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If we take a look at the frequency of single words, excluding common stop
































Figure 5.8: Word frequency.
is relatively preserved. There are some concrete cases where a given word
disappears with big values of k, but the overall result is quite good.
This kind of studies are normally performed with much bigger datasets (note
that the most frequent word appears less than a 2.5%). The fact that our
method preserves the frequencies with relatively smaller sets points to an
even better preservation in bigger datasets.
5.3.3 Conclusions
To provide microaggregation at a user level, we have defined a new user
distance and aggregation operator. The user aggregation described in Sec-
tion 5.3.1.4 was designed in order to be as computationally efficient as pos-
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sible. Note that the most important part is the aggregation of the queries
since it is the information that will be more valuable in future analysis.
Note also that queries are aggregated separately. An alternative could be to
actually mix the terms of queries from different users to end up with new
queries that somehow summarize all the users’ queries. We opted for the
first approach given the complexity that the second one imposes, and also
because it already produced satisfactory results as show in Section 5.3.2.
The other parts of the query are aggregated with the most common aggrega-
tion operators used in data privacy and statistical disclosure control. Other
operators could easily be used, if required.
As it always happens with statistical disclosure techniques, there is a trade-
off between privacy and usability. We have shown that our proposal, besides
providing k-anonymity, maintains the information of the original logs to
some extent.
5.3.3.1 Publications
• G. Navarro-Arribas, V. Torra, A. Erola and J. Castellà-Roca, User
k-anonymity for privacy preserving data mining of query logs, Infor-
mation Processing and Management, Vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 476-487, May
2012, ISSN: 0306-4573.
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5.4 Semantic microaggregation of search logs
Section 5.3 presented a method to provide k-anonymity in search logs by
microaggregation. While preventing the identity disclosure, the microag-
gregation based on the aggregation of several distance functions minimizes
the information loss. However, the system is hampered by the evaluation of
query similarities, which is solely based on spelling and syntactical matching.
As we mention before, query logs have variable length and high dimen-
sionality, compared to the relatively few attributes and values in relational
records. Datasets with these characteristics are usually referred as set-valued
data [102]. The management of set-valued data with textual values, arises
new challenges that are not considered by methods focused on numerical or
categorical data [66, 107]. Contrary to numerical data, which can be com-
pared and transformed by means of mathematical operators (so that the
anonymization can preserve statistical properties of the dataset), textual
data require operators of aggregation and comparison that take the seman-
tics of the text into account. As acknowledged by several authors [67, 107], it
is crucial to preserve the semantics of textual data during the anonymization
process in order to maintain their utility.
As a example, consider the concepts flu, golf, hypertension, football and a
microaggregation method with k = 2. If the similarity function takes into
account the semantics of the concepts, the two clusters [flu, hypertension]
and [golf, football] can be created. On the contrary, if the similarity function
takes into account the length of the concepts, the two clusters [flu, golf ] and
[hypertension, football] can be created. The first pair can be generalized by
illnesses and sports, while the second one cannot be generalized without
providing useless results, i.e. the resulting data is too distorted.
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5.4.1 Towards a semantic interpretation of query logs
None of the mentioned methods in section 3.2 consider the semantics of
queries during the anonymization process: they execute random or distribu-
tion-based transformations over data. In order to maximize the utility of
anonymized logs, we need to pay special attention to the preservation of their
semantics [67, 107]. To that end, we first need to map queries with their
formal semantics. However, because semantics is an inherent human feature,
the interpretation of textual data requires the exploitation of some sort of
human-tailored machine-readable knowledge source. This allows mapping
between words and their conceptual abstractions, analyzing the latter ac-
cording to their semantic interrelations. Taxonomies, folksonomies and more
general ontologies [44] have proven their usefulness as structured knowledge
sources, thus enabling the interpretation of text at semantic level.
We propose a semantic microaggregation method that maps queries with
their formal semantics using the Open Directory Project (ODP) [77] as
knowledge base. The rationale behind our proposal is simple: the aggrega-
tion of users (users’ logs) with more common interests minimizes the infor-
mation loss.
5.4.1.1 ODP
ODP is the most widely distributed database of Web content classified by
humans. ODP data powers the core directory services for some of the most
popular portals and search engines on the Web, including AOL Search,
Netscape Search, Google, Lycos, and HotBot, and hundreds of others. Thus,
a query result using them is hardly influenced by the ODP classification.
ODP uses a hierarchical ontology structure to classify sites according to
their themes. For example, when we search for Barcelona FC, ODP returns
a list of categories where the query belongs to (Figure 5.9) to. Each result
starts with a root category followed by deeper categories in the ODP tree.
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Open Directory Categories (1-5 of 5)
1. Sports: Soccer: UEFA: Spain: Clubs: Barcelona (11 matches)
2. World: Polski: Sport: Sporty pilki i siatki: Pilka nozna: Kluby: (...)
3. World: Espanol: Regional: Europa: Espaa: Deportes y tiempo libre: (...)
4. World: Deutsch: Sport: Ballsport: Fuball: Vereine: Spanien (3)
5. World: Francais: Sports: Balles et ballons: Football: Rgional: (...)
Figure 5.9: Example of ODP query result.
5.4.1.2 An ODP similarity measure
In order to be able to microaggregate users from the query logs, we have
to define a distance or similarity measure between users. We introduce a
similarity coefficient based on the common categories shared between queries
from each user. We also introduce some notation here to formalize the
process.
We consider the set of n users U = {u1, . . . , un} from the query log, and their
respective set of queries Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn}, where Qi = {q
i
1
, . . . , qimi} are
the queries of the user ui. Each query q
i
j has several terms q
i
j = {t1, . . . , trj}.
Given a term ts, we can obtain its classification in ODP at a given depth.
When querying ODP, the returned categories can be divided in depth levels.
Let l be the parameter that identifies the depth level in the ODP hierarchy.
For example, if we have the classification Sports : Soccer : UEFA : Spain :
Clubs : Barcelona and l = 1, we only work with the root category Sports;
when l = 2 we work with Sports : Soccer; and so on. We will consider a
maximum depth L to restrict the search space, so l ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
We denote as Cl = {c
l
1
, . . . , clpl} the set of possible categories at level l in
the ODP. Given a user ui we can obtain all the categories at level l from all
queries of the user. We denote the set of categories for user ui at level l as
Cl(ui). Note that considering all the queries of user ui, Qi = {q
i
1
, . . . , qimi},
and their respective sets of terms qij = {t1, . . . , trj} for j = 1 . . .mi, the
number of categories for user ui at level l is given by |Cl(ui)| = r1+ . . .+rmi .
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We can then define a similarity coefficient ODPsim between two given users





{|cl| : cl ∈ {Cl(ui) ∩ Cl(uj)}} (5.5)
This similarity coefficient between two users computes the common cate-
gories between them for all considered levels, that is, levels up to L. Note
that OPDsim is symmetric and ranges from 0 (there is no similarity between
the users) to
∑L
l=1 |Cl| (maximum similarity between two users).
5.4.2 ODP-based microaggregation of query logs
The method we propose to protect query logs is a microaggregation that
follows the outline of Section 5.4.1 with an extra step of data preparation.




These steps are described in detail in the following sections.
5.4.3 Data preparation
To ease the computation of the protected data, the data are prepared by pre-
querying ODP to classify the user queries. Following the notation introduced
in Section 5.4.1.2, for every term ts, we can obtain its classification for all
levels l ∈ {1, . . . , L} using ODP. This allows us to obtain all the categories
associated to all the users in all levels, that is, Cl(ui) for all user ui ∈ U , and
all considered levels. Next, we create a classification matrix that contains
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the number of queries for each user and category at level l, MU×Cl . Note
that we obtain one matrix for every level l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. So, MU×Cl(i, j) is
the number of times that category clj is found in the queries of user ui.
Finally, we use the MU×Cl matrices in order to compute the incidence ma-
trix that contains the semantic similiarity of the users MU×U . Given the
incidence matrix MU×U , MU×U (i, j) is the number of common categories
between users ui, and uj for all depth levels l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Moreover, note
that the incidence matrix corresponds to the similarity coefficient described
in Section 5.4.1.2, that is, MU×U (i, j) = ODPsim(ui, uj).
The process works as follows:
1. Obtain the classification matrices MU×Cl using Algorithm 2.
2. Obtain the incidence matrix MU×U using Algorithm 3, i.e. the simi-
larity coefficient between users.
5.4.3.1 Partition
The partition step creates groups of k users with similar interests using
Algorithm 4.
Let us assume that ui and uρ are the most similar users in the set. We
calculate the users’ similarity ODPsim using the incidence matrix MU×U ,
(see Section 5.4.3). The most similar users are those that have the highest
similarity coefficient in the matrix. Next, we include ui and uρ to the cluster.
If the group size k is two, we delete ui and uρ records from the incidence
matrix and we repeat the process to obtain a new cluster. When the group
size is bigger than two, we merge the columns and rows of ui and uρ creating
a new user u′. u′ is the addition of both users, ui and uρ. Let us assume,
that uξ is the most similar user to u
′. Next, we include uξ to the cluster
with ui and uρ. The method executes this process k − 2 times.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for computing the classification matrices MLU×C
where L = {1, . . . , l}
Require: the maximum depth L for the ODP categories
Require: the set of users U = {ui, . . . , un}
Require: the set of queries Qi = {q
i
1
, . . . , qimi} of each user ui
Require: the set of terms {t1, . . . , trj} of each query qj
Ensure: {MU×C1 , . . . ,MU×CL}, i.e. for every level l, the matrix MU×Cl
with the number of queries for each category and user in the depth l
for l ∈ {1, . . . , L} do
for ui ∈ {u1, . . . , un} do
for qij ∈ Qi = {q
i
1
, . . . , qimi} do
for ts ∈ q
i
j = {t1, . . . , trj} do
obtain the categories ct at depth l for the term ts using ODP;
for each ct do
if ct ∈ MU×Cl then
MU×Cl(ui, ct) = MU×Cl(ui, ct) + 1;
else
add the column ct to MU×Cl ;







return {MU×C1 , . . . ,MU×CL}.
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm for computing the incidence matrix MU×U
Require: the calssification matrices {MU×C1 , . . . ,MU×CL}
Ensure: MU×U
Initialize MU×U (i, j)← 0 for all i, j = 1 . . . n;
for MU×Cl ∈ {MU×C1 , . . . ,MU×CL} do
for each column cj ∈ MU×Cl do
for each row ui ∈ MU×Cl do
for each row uρ ∈ MU×Cl do







Algorithm 4 Algorithm for computing the clusters Z = {z1, . . . , zγ} of
users
Require: the set of users U = {u1, . . . , un}
Require: the incidence matrix MU×U
Require: the clusters size k
Ensure: the clusters Z = {z1, . . . , zγ} of users for γ = ⌈n/k⌉
M
′
U×U ← MU×U ;
U ′ ← U ;
while |U ′| ≤ k do
obtain the cluster z of k users using the Algorithm 5 and M
′
U×U ;
remove the users ui ∈ z form U
′;
remove the columns and the rows of the users ui ∈ z form M
′
U×U ;
add z to the set Z;
end while
return Z = {z1, . . . , zγ}.
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Algorithm 5 Algorithm for computing a cluster z of k users
Require: a incidence matrix M
′
U×U
Require: the clusters size k
Ensure: a cluster z of k users
z ← ∅;




add (ui, uρ) to the set z;
while (|z| < k) and (columns(M
′
U×U ) > 0) do





U×U (cs, uρ) = M
′









U×U (ui, rs) = M
′




delete the column uρ of matrix M
′
U×U ;
delete the row uρ of matrix M
′
U×U ;
obtain the new ui’s most similar user uρ, i.e. the cell of the user ui with
the highest value;
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5.4.3.2 Aggregation
For every cluster zj formed in the partition step, we compute its aggregation
by selecting specific queries from each user in the group. That is, given
the cluster of users zj = {u1, . . . , uk}, we obtain a new user uzj as the
representative (or centroid) of the cluster, which summarizes the queries of
all the users of the cluster. The selection of queries is based on the following
principles:
1. We give priority to queries semantically close between them.
2. The number of queries that a user contributes to the cluster represen-
tative is proportional to the number of queries of the user.
The first principle is considered in the partition step described in Sec-
tion 5.4.3.1, since clusters are composed of users with semantically simi-
lar queries. The second principle is formalized defining some indexes as
described below.
First, the number of queries of the centroid is the average of the number of
queries of each user ui of the cluster zj . Then, the contribution of a user ui
(Contribi) to the centroid of a cluster with k users depends on her number











More formally, the aggregation method runs Algorithm 6 for each cluster.
First, it sorts logs from all users descending by query repetitions. Then, for
each user ui of the cluster and while not reaching Quotai:
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1. Add the first query of her sorted list with a probability Contribi ×
#qj repetitions. For example, if ui has a query which is repeated 3
times, and Contribi is 0.4, as 3 · 0.4 = 1.2, the method adds one query
to the new log and then randomly chooses whether to add it again or
not according to the presence probability 0.2.
2. Delete the first query of the list.
Algorithm 6 Algorithm to aggregate the k users of the cluster z
Require: a cluster z of k users
Require: the quota Quotai of each user of the cluster z
Require: the contribution Contribi of each user of the cluster z
Require: the set of queries Qi of each user of the cluster z
Require: the queries list SL
Require: the microagregged log ML
Ensure: the centroid of the cluster z
ML ← ∅
for each user ui ∈ z do
SL ← sort Qi = {q
i
1
, . . . , qimi} by query repetitions.
while not reach Quotai do
Add the first query qi
1












We have tested our microaggregation method using real data from the AOL
logs released in 2006, which correspond to the queries performed by 650 000
users over three months. We randomly selected 1 000 users, which cor-
respond to 55 666 lines of query logs. The usefulness evaluation and the
results are presented below.
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5.4.4.1 Usefulness Evaluation Method
For each user we have her original set of queries and the corresponding
protected ones by means of our microaggregation method. All queries can
be classified into categories, i.e., each query is classified into the L first depth
levels of the ODP.
In order to verify that our method preserves the usefulness of the data (i.e. it
does not introduce too much perturbation), we count the number of queries
of each category for a given level l, which are in the original log as well as
in the centroid, ρ. This number is divided by the number of original queries





To summarize, our evaluation method does not only match two equal terms
in both logs, but also a term in the protected log that replaces one with
closest semantic in the original log. By using a random partition algorithm,
users of each cluster might not be semantically close.
Consider, as an example of the worst case, a cluster of k users {u1, . . . , uk}
with respective queries Q = {Q1, . . . , Qk}, such that Qi ∩ Qj = ∅ for all
i 6= j. Thus, only the queries of a single user in a specific topic will appear
in the centroid.
In this case, the number of queries of ui that appear in the centroid can be
calculated using formula 5.7 and it is known that the sum of all quotas is χ.
Therefore, in the worst case, i.e., when no common interests between users
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5.4.4.2 Results
As discussed in Section 5.4.1.1, ODP returns a list of categories for every
term (or query), and each category is composed of various hierarchical levels.
In our method, one or all categories can be used and, for each category,
either all hierarchical levels or some of them can be considered. Intuitively,
the more categories and levels (deeper levels) that are used, the higher the
computational cost should be, and, perhaps, a better SRP can be achieved.
Thus, we want to study how these parameters influence the SRP and the
computational cost:
• ODP levels: every term has a categorization up to a hierarchical level,
and the deepest level can be different for every term. The deeper the
level is, the less terms that have information in this level there will
be. We want to know the deepest level that gives information for a
majority of terms.
• SRP vs. ODP-categories: we want to know the SRP value when we
use more or less categories, i.e., if we use more categories, the SRP
can be either higher, or have approximately the same SRP.
• Computational cost vs. ODP-categories: Supposing that more cat-
egories are used, the higher the computational cost will be, but the
extra cost should be known. If the extra cost is not significant and a
better SRP is obtained, more categories can be used.
5.4.4.3 ODP levels
In ODP, not all terms rank up to a certain level. For example, our working
set of queries has terms with two levels (minimum) and others with twelve
levels (maximum). In the study of the above mentioned relations (SRP vs.
ODP-categories and computational-cost vs. ODP-levels), levels that do not
have a ranking for the majority of terms can be ignored because such levels
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only give information to improve the SRP for a reduced number of terms.
Thus, we consider a level if it has information for, at least, the 50% of the
terms (queries).
In this sense, we have calculated for every level the percentage of terms that
have a result for the level, and Figure 5.10 shows the percentage of queries
(our working set of queries) that can be classified up to a certain depth
level in the ODP tree. It can be observed that only 57% of queries can be






















Figure 5.10: Percentage of queries that can be classified up to a certain
level in ODP
5.4.4.4 SRP vs. ODP-categories
Besides some initial tests [38], we have calculated the percentage of semanti-
cally similar queries as the accumulation of levels, i.e., add the coincidences
of level 1 and 2 to calculate the percentage of semantically similar queries
at level 2. In this current work, we have changed the evaluation method be-
cause we think that evaluating each level separately is better to understand
the remaining similarity of the queries in that level.
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We have compared the results obtained (SRP) by either using the first five
categories returned by the ODP or using only the first one. The range is suf-
ficient in order to evaluate the SRP behavior when we use more categories.
Note that the first category that gives ODP is the most significative for the
introduced term. Figure 5.11 shows, for cluster sizes 2, 3, 4 and 5, the av-
erage SRP that users obtain for various levels L. The dark color represents
the obtained results using the first category returned by the ODP, and the
light color represents the obtained results using the first five categories.
Figure 5.11: Semantic similarity percentage of microaggregated logs
using either the first category or the five first categories returned by the
ODP.
It can be observed that both tests improve the theoretical SRP (see Sec-
tion 5.4.4) with all depth levels. By using more categories in the ODP
classification, we achieve less similarity loss for deeper levels and larger clus-
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ter sizes. For instance, when L = 1, the same gain is obtained in all cases,
but when L = 5 and k = 5, the difference gain is approximately 10% using
the first five categories instead of only the first one.
5.4.4.5 Computational cost vs. ODP-categories
The computation cost is larger when more categories are used. Figure 5.12
shows the average time required to microaggregate logs for cluster sizes
k = {2, . . . , 5} for various levels. It can be determined that by using the
first five ODP categories, the average time is three times larger than using
























1 category 5 categories
Figure 5.12: Average required time to microaggregate logs using our
method for various ODP levels.
Tests were run on a Pentium Core 2 Duo 2.2Ghz without source code paral-
lelization. Figure 5.12 demonstrates that the required time increases linearly
with the number of user queries. Nonetheless, the program could be paral-
lelized as follows:
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• Data preparation: as each user has her queries, the classification
matrices MU×C can be computed simultaneously. Then, each cell of
the incidence matrix MU×U can be calculated independently, since the
classification matrix of each user is available.
• Partition: the partition process is linear and cannot be parallelized,
but it is a negligible part of the whole process. The time required for
its calculation represents less than one percent of the total time.
• Aggregation: as users are divided into k groups, the logs’ aggregation
of each group can be run simultaneously.
Thus, the program parallelization could make the proposal scalable for very-
large systems.
5.4.5 Conclusions
The existing microaggregation techniques for query logs do not usually take
the semantic proximity between users into account, which is negatively re-
flected in the usefulness of the resulting data. We have presented a new
microaggregation method for query logs, based on a semantic clustering
algorithm. To that end, we use ODP as knowledge base to interpret the
queries’ terms and its hierarchy as metric space to define a distance oper-
ator. Aggregation is performed selecting randomly queries inside the same
cluster.
We have tested our proposal using real query logs from AOL. As we have
seen, we obtain good results, both in terms of information loss and in terms
of protection, which is guaranteed because our method ensures k-anonymity
at user level.
It also should be taken into consideration that we are working with a set of
1, 000 users, randomly selected from the AOL files. We expect to achieve
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greater SRP values working with a larger set, because more similar users
may be grouped.
The utility of the data is calculated according to a discrete function which
evaluates the relation between two queries in our metric space. The utility
obtained using one category per query or five categories per query, while
closer in some levels, shows that the latter minimizes information loss. We
assume that it is the effect of a biased queries’ interpretation, and as much
meanings we have for a query, the easier to find relations is.
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5.5 Semantic microaggregation optimization
Section 5.4 presented a semantic aggregation method that uses the Open
Directory Project (ODP) as knowledge source [38, 37]. To that end, we
look for each word of each query in ODP and retrieve the categories to
which they belong (word’s semantics). However, even though this method
compares queries at a conceptual level (i.e. according to their categories), it
fails to retain the meaning of the complex queries with several words or noun
phrases, inasmuch queries are processed word by word (e.g. water sports was
mapped to the concepts water and sport). In [46], even thought the author
uses WordNet as knowledge base, similar problem occurs. The omission of
this relation between query’s words can results in a loss of semantics [68].
However, complex queries cannot be directly mapped to concepts in a knowl-
edge base. Hence, in order to reduce the information loss resulting from
query removal, we propose to apply several linguistic analyses to query logs
which improve the recall and accuracy of the conceptual mapping.
5.5.1 Query anonymization method
In this section, we present a query log anonymization method which care-
fully considers the semantics of all kind of queries (i.e. from one-word to
multiple noun phrases containing proper nouns). To that end, we adapt
the MDAV microaggregation algorithm in order to coherently deal with set-
valued datasets like query logs. We take special care in minimizing the
disclosure risk while retaining their utility of the anonymized query logs.
Given a set of records, each one corresponding to the set of queries performed
by each user, the basic steps of the method are:
1. Query processing and conceptual mapping : in order to semantically
interpret textual queries, these are processed so that syntactical con-
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structions (i.e. noun phrases) can be mapped to their conceptual ab-
stractions modeled in a knowledge base.
2. Semantic data partition: clusters of query logs of at least k-users are
created (fulfilling k-anonymity) by means of the MDAV microaggrega-
tion algorithm. The cluster construction process and the centroid cal-
culus method, on which the MDAV method relies, have been adapted
in order to consider query semantics and the distributional properties
of set-valued data.
3. Semantic query anonymization: clustered query logs are replaced by
a synthetic set of queries that represent both their meaning and their
distribution. Synthetic query logs are constructed minimizing the in-
formation loss and the disclosure risk owing to the replacement.
5.5.1.1 Query processing and conceptual mapping
In order to semantically interpret users’ queries, we need to map them to
their formal semantics (i.e. conceptual abstractions) in a background knowl-
edge base. Users’ queries, being free text strings, could be problematic to
manage. They may directly correspond to an individual concept (e.g. com-
puters), to a specialization (e.g. Apple computer), but also to a concate-
nation of several concepts, within a syntactically coherent sentence (e.g.
stores offering bargain Apple computers), or even a raw list of unconnected
terms (e.g. computers Apple store bargain). These last examples of complex
queries, which are usually performed by users of web search engines [64],
cannot be directly mapped to concepts in a knowledge base.
Works dealing with query logs have not deeply addressed the analysis of
complex queries [93]. Some of them [110] simply avoid queries than cannot
be directly found in the knowledge base. This reduces the posterior analysis
and anonymization to queries with single terms (e.g. computer) or simple
noun phrases (e.g. cell phone). Other works [46, 37] simply extract individ-
ual words from complex queries, mapping each one to their corresponding
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concept. These methods fail to properly interpret noun phrases composed
by several words (e.g. the meaning of water sports is different to water +
sports).
Accordingly, we propose to apply several linguistic analyses to query logs in
order to improve the recall and accuracy of the conceptual mapping. This
will help to better characterize the users in the posterior anonymization and,
hence, to better retain data utility.
Query processing Let U = {u1, . . . , um} be the set of users represented
by their query logs, and let ur = {q1, . . . , qp} be the queries extracted from
the query log of the user ur.
Each query, qj , is morpho-syntactically analyzed to extract semantic units.
A semantic unit is a piece of text that refers to a unique concept. We
focus our action on Noun Phrases (NPs) which consist of a set of words in
which at least one of them (i.e. the one most on the right) is a noun. This
noun, which corresponds to a concept (e.g. sports), can be specialized by
adding other nouns or adjectives on the left (e.g. water sports). To extract
NPs, we apply several natural language processing methods [79]: sentence
detection, tokenization (i.e. word detection, separating contractions, for
example), part-of-speech (POS) tagging and syntactic parsing (i.e. POS-
tagged words are put together according to their role, such as Noun phrase
or Verb phrase).
As a result of this process, a query qj is split into several ones qj = {qj1, . . . ,
qjl}, each one corresponding to a NP. In this manner, user queries with
several NPs are treated as several individual queries for anonymization pur-
poses u′r = {q11, . . . , qj1, . . . , qpl}, considering that each one contributes to
the semantic characterization of the user.
Example 1. Let the query log of user ur be q1 =diving in the Mediter-
ranean, and q2 =windsurfing in the Mediterranean. The first query is split
into two individual queries: q11 =diving and q12 =Mediterranean; the sec-
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ond one is also split into two individual queries: q21 =windsurfing and
q22 =Mediterranean.
Conceptual mapping In order to map individual queries to their con-
ceptual abstractions in a knowledge base, we look for query-concept label
matchings. Since words and NPs could be expressed (both in the queries
and in the knowledge base) with different linguistic/morphological variations
(e.g. water sport, water sports, this water sports, etc.), we apply additional
analyses to detect equivalent formulations of the same concept.
1. Domain-independent words with very general meanings like determi-
nants, prepositions and adverbs, called stop words, are removed from
NPs (e.g. this water sports = water sports).
2. Both queries and concept labels in the knowledge based are stemmed [83]
to remove derivational affixes of the same root word (e.g. plurals),
identifying equivalent terms (e.g. water sports = water sport).
3. When a query composed by several words is not found in the knowl-
edge base, we look for simpler query forms by progressively removing
adjectives/nouns starting from the one most on the left (e.g. exciting
water sports → water sports). The fact that NPs incorporate qualifiers
is quite common in texts but these are scarcely covered in knowledge
structures which try to model concepts in a general way. With this
strategy, we improve the recall of the conceptual mapping while main-
taining, up to a degree, the core semantics of the query.
Knowledge base Semantically-grounded related works either use Word-
Net [46] or ad-hoc Value Generalization Hierarchies (VGHs) [102] in order
to map query terms to concepts. Both present limitations. The former has
a low coverage of proper nouns/named entities, which are very common in
query logs [93]. In the latter, the construction of ad-hoc VGHs is costly and
unfeasible.
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Consequently, we used the Open Directory Project (ODP) as the knowledge
base in this work (see Section 5.4.1). The advantage is its large size and high
recall, with more than one million categories covering up-to-date recently
minted terms and named entities. ODP data files can be downloaded in
SQL format and categories can be consulted off-line efficiently. Hence, users
are mapped to categories, using ODP.
Let ζu = {Cu1 , . . . , Cur , . . . , Cum} be the set of users represented by cate-
gories, and let Cur = {< c1, w1 >, . . . , < cj , wj >, . . . , < cn, wn >} be the
categories obtained from the query log of user u′r = {q11, . . . , qj1, . . . , qpl},
where < ci, wi > define a value tuple in which ci is each distinct category ob-
tained from the set of queries of user u′r, and wi is its number of repetitions.
Note that different queries could be mapped to the same category.
Finally, we define T (ci) = {cj ∈ ODP | cj generalizes ci}∪{ci} as the taxo-
nomic generalizations of category ci in ODP, including ci, which summarizes
the meaning of ci.
Example 2. Following Example 1, individual queries q11 =diving,
q12 =Mediterranean, q21 =windsurfing and q22 =Mediterranean are mapped
to ODP obtaining Cur ={<Swimming and Diving, 1>, <Mediterranean, 2>,
<Windsurfing, 1>} and the taxonomic generalizations: T(Swimming and
Diving)= {Sports,Water Sports, Swimming andDiving}, T(Mediterranean)=
{Regional, Europe, Regions, Mediterranean}, T(Windsurfing)= {Sports, Wa-
ter Sports, Windsurfing}.
5.5.1.2 Semantic data partition
Data partition pursues to create clusters of query logs so that each cluster
contains, at least, k users. The MDAV microaggregation method has been
used to achieve this goal. MDAV relies on two basic functions that depend
on the type of data to be processed: a comparison operator that measures
the distance between records to add new ones in a cluster, and an averaging
function to calculate the centroid used to create clusters.
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Due to the characteristics of query logs, the adaptation of MDAV to this
kind of data is not trivial. First, contrary to numerical data that can be
compared, averaged and transformed by means of mathematical functions,
textual queries require operators that consider their semantics [66]. More-
over, as queries define set-valued datasets with variable length and possible
value repetitions, the coherent comparison/aggregation of query logs with
different cardinalities and value distributions is also challenging.
In this section, we propose semantically-grounded comparison and averaging
operators that are able to consider the distributional characteristics of set-
valued data. Our goal is to make the MDAV-based data partition to capture
both the meaning and the distribution of query logs, so that the information
loss resulting from the posterior anonymization can be minimized.
Comparing queries As a result of the query processing and the concep-
tual mapping, the query log of each user is represented by a set of categories
with their corresponding taxonomical generalizations. Hence, we propose a
measure that computes the semantic distance between categories, according
to their taxonomical trees.
Classical ontology-based methods estimate the distance between terms, ac-
cording to the number of taxonomical generalizations/specializations that
are needed to go from one term to another. This is equivalent to computing
the length of the minimum taxonomical path defined between the pair of
terms. However, due to their simplicity, they omit much of the taxonomical
knowledge explicitly modeled in the knowledge base, achieving a relatively
low accuracy [92]. More recent works [8, 92] significantly improve these
basic methods by evaluating all the taxonomical ancestors of the compared
terms: they measure the distance between terms as a function of the amount
of their shared and non-shared taxonomical generalizations.
Considering that the ontological scheme of ODP provides detailed taxo-
nomical structures, our distance measure is designed based on the same
principles. Given a pair of categories c1, c2 (each one representing a query),
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we evaluate their distance δs(c1, c2) according to the amount of non-shared
taxonomical generalizations in ODP. Moreover, we can also suppose that
category pairs that have more generalizations in common are less distant
than those sharing a fewer generalizations. Hence, the semantic distance is
computed as the ratio between the amount of non-shared categories and the
sum of shared and non-shared categories 5.10.
Definition (Semantic distance between categories (δs)): The semantic dis-
tance between a pair of categories c1, c2 is defined as:
δs(c1, c2) =
|T (c1) ∪ T (c2)| − |T (c1) ∩ T (c2)|
|T (c1) ∪ T (c2)|
(5.10)
Note that, by including the compared categories in T, we are able to dis-
tinguish different categories that have all their generalizations in common
from two identical categories.
Example 3. Given the pair of categories: c1 =Swimming and Diving and
c2 =Windsurfing ; we have, as shown in example 2, that T (c1) ={Sports,
Water Sports, Swimming and Diving} and T (c2) ={Sports, Water Sports,
Windsurfing}. Hence, the semantic distance between categories (equation




User query log comparison The proposed measure (equation 5.10)
has to be extended to semantically compare pairs of user query logs (instead
of individual queries). Then, logs can be clustered by means of the MDAV
algorithm. However, since query logs of different users may have different
lengths and value distributions, it is necessary to integrate distance values
between sets of different cardinalities.
The coherent integration is based on the fact that psychological studies show
that people pay more attention to the similar features between entities rather
than to their differences [40]. Considering categories of user queries as user
features, given a category ci of u1, we compare it against all categories of u2,
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taking the minimum distance value as the result of this comparison, because
it states the highest evidence of similarity between users with respect to
feature ci.
Note that multiple occurrences of the same category may appear in a query
log, either because a user repeats a query or because several queries are
mapped to the same category (i.e. they represent the same concept, such
as Varicella and Chicken Pox ). The distribution of queries/categories in
a query log is also an important feature of the user and, together with
category semantics, should be considered and preserved by anonymization
methods [25]. In order to consider the category distribution, distance mea-
surements for each different category are multiplied by its number of repe-
titions (Equation 5.11).





where < ci, wi >∈ Cu1 and the cardinality |Cu2 | is the number of different
categories of user u2.
By repeating the process and adding the distance value between each ci of
u1 against u2, we obtain the aggregated distance from u1 to u2. Note that
this distance may be different when evaluating it from u2 to u1. Hence,
the final distance between u1 and u2 will be the sum between the distances
computed from u1 to u2 and from u2 to u1 (Equation 5.12).

















To obtain normalized distance values between query logs (in the [0, 1] inter-
val) so that different user pairs can be compared regardless the cardinality
of their logs, we divide it by the number of categories (including repetitions)
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of both users.
Definition (Semantic distance between users (Ds)): The semantic distance
between users (i.e. the set of categories Cu1 and Cu2 obtained from the
queries of user u1 and u2, respectively) is defined in Equation 5.13.














Example 4. Given the categories of users query logs Cu1 ={<Swimming
and Diving,1>, <Mediterranean,1>} and Cu2 ={<Windsurfing,1>, <Medi-
terranean, 2>}; and considering the taxonomic generalizations T(Swimming
and Diving)= {Sports, Water Sports, Swimming and Diving}, T(Windsurf-
ing)={Sports, Water Sports, Windsurfing} and T(Mediterranean)={Regio-
nal, Europe, Regions, Mediterranean}; the distance between users is com-
puted as:
Ds(Cu1 , Cu2) =





Centroid calculus The centroid is understood as the value (or value set
in our case) that minimizes the distance against all records in the dataset.
When dealing with continuous-scale numerical data, the centroid can be
accurately computed by averaging values. However, for textual data, the
centroid must necessarily be discretized. In this case, some authors [33]
select the centroid of textual/categorical datasets by picking up those which
appear more frequently (i.e. the mode). However, this approximation omits
the semantics of data.
Given that the distance measure presented above evaluates both the seman-
tic and distributional features of query logs, we use it to compute the dataset
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centroid, which is selected as the user query log that minimizes the sum of
distances to all other query logs in the dataset.
Definition (Centroid): Given the distance function Ds, the centroid of a set
of users represented by categories ζu = {Cu1 , . . . , Cur , . . . , Cum} is defined
in equation 5.14.








where argmin stands for argument of minimum, i.e. the values of Cur for
which
∑m
i=1Ds(Cur , Cui) attains its minimum value.
As a result of applying the MDAV algorithm, users’ query logs will be





clusters of, at least, k users. We define P = p1, . . . , pd
as the partition of clusters obtained.
5.5.1.3 Query log anonymization
To fulfill the k-anonymity property, the aggregation step requires to replace
all query logs of each cluster by a representative query set. Ideally, this
representative should be the most similar (or least distant) to all elements
in the cluster, so that the information loss resulting from that replacement
can be minimized.
In a general microaggregation scenario, this representative is usually cal-
culated as the centroid of the cluster [30, 22]. However, in the query log
anonymization context, selecting a representative as given by equation 5.14
may lead to undesirable consequences. First, the fact that the centroid cor-
responds to the query log of a concrete user may excessively expose her,
especially if an attacker has partial knowledge (e.g. some user queries are
known) [46]. Moreover, since the representative can only be picked from the
set of original users, it may not accurately represent the average distribu-
tional features of the represented group.
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To palliate some of these problems, in some works [102] the representative
is synthetically built by replacing queries in clusters with concepts that
generalize all/some of them, according to a background taxonomy. Hence,
anonymized query logs would be composed by sets of concepts rather than
real queries. This fact hampers the utility of the anonymized logs in some
environments in which queries (instead of their conceptual abstraction) are
needed, such as query formulation analysis [6, 109].
In this work, we have also opted for creating synthetic query log representa-
tives that do not correspond to the log of any concrete user to minimize her
disclosure risk. However, we maintain individual queries untouched while re-
taining, as much as possible, the semantic and distributional characteristics
of the represented cluster. The creation of synthetic query log representa-




Cur be the set of users (represented by their categories)
belonging to a cluster pt. The construction of the representative for that
cluster, that is p̄t, follows these steps:
1. First, we select a sole category that semantically represents the cluster
pt. This category, zt, is the one that minimizes the sum of distances δs
to all other categories corresponding to the users in the cluster, that
is, Cpt . Hence, zt corresponds to the centroid category of the cluster
pt. In order to consider both semantic and distributional features in
the selection of zt, semantic distances, δs, are weighted by the number
of repetitions of each category in the cluster.
Definition (Centroid Category (zt)). The centroid category zt of a
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2. Then, the representative p̄t of a cluster pt is built from the subset of
categories in the cluster that are most similar to the centroid category
zt. This is done from two perspectives:
(a) First, the categories of each user are sorted according to its dis-
tance with the above-selected centroid category zt (equation 5.15).
δs(zt, ci) = wi × δs(zt, ci) (5.15)
(b) Second, to construct p̄t in a way that it also reflects the distri-
bution of categories in the cluster, we compute the contribution
(quota) that each user ur in pt should have in the representative.
This quota states the number of semantically similar categories
from Cur (with respect to zt, according to equation 5.15) that
a user ur in pt will contribute to p̄t. The quota of each user ur
is computed as the ratio between her number of categories (in-
cluding repetitions) in Cur and the number of users in the cluster
pt.







According to the above criteria, we build the representative p̄t by pick-
ing up Quota(ur) categories (considering their number of repetitions
as shown in equation 5.16) from the sorted list of categories (with re-
spect to the centroid category zt, according to equation 5.16) of each
user ur in the cluster. In this manner, a proportional number of user
categories which are the most semantically similar to the centroid cat-
egory zt will be incorporated to the representative. The number of
categories picked up for each user in the representative will reflect the
original distribution of queries in the input dataset, that is, users with
many queries will contribute more than those with a few of them.
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3. The final step consists in replacing categories in p̄t by appropriate
queries picked up from the original dataset, so that anonymized data
can still be useful for query-analysis tasks [6, 105]. Specifically, each
category in p̄t is replaced by a query taken from the whole original
dataset corresponding to that category. These queries are randomly
picked up from the set of suitable ones. Thanks to this random crite-
rion, we minimize the chance that the cluster representative contains
exact subsequences of queries of individual users, a circumstance that
may compromise her anonymity [46]. At the same time, since query
categories match, we also retain semantics in anonymized data.
As a result of the above process, user query logs of each cluster are replaced
with a synthetic query log (p̄t) that contains a representative distribution of
those queries found in the original dataset, which are also the most seman-
tically similar to all users logs in the cluster. Hence, the final result is a set
of anoymized user query logs UA = {u1A , . . . , umA}.
Notice that since the computational complexity of MDAV is O(m2) and be-
cause the proposed semantic adaptation (using semantic similarity distances
to compare query logs) does not affect the overall complexity of the algo-
rithm, our method scales quadratic with respect to the dataset size, making
it comparable to other aggregation-based anonymization methods in terms
of scalability [38, 75].
5.5.2 Evaluation
In this section, the evaluation of the proposed method is detailed and com-
pared against related works. First, we present the evaluation measures used
to quantify the disclosure risk and utility of anonymized query logs (Sec-
tion 5.5.2.1). Section 5.5.2.2 introduces other query anonymization strate-
gies implemented to compare our results. And we finally present and discuss
the results for the evaluated methods in Section 5.5.2.3.
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5.5.2.1 Evaluation measures
As stated in the introduction, anonymization methods should maintain a
trade-off between two opposite dimensions: data utility, as an inverse func-
tion of information loss, and disclosure risk, that is, the chance of an intruder
to disclosure the identity of an individual or de-identification. In this section,
the measures used to evaluate these dimensions are detailed.
From a general perspective, the utility of anonymized data is retained if
the same conclusions can be extracted from the analysis of the original and
anonymized datasets. To evaluate up to which point a query anonymization
method retains the utility of data (or minimizes the information loss) in
an objective and practical way, we rely on data mining techniques. Data
mining aims at extracting useful information by characterizing user profiles
or preferences. To do so, data mining techniques, and clustering methods in
particular, are used to create groups of homogeneous users.
We propose to compute the information loss (IL) of an anonymization
method by comparing the partitions resulting from original and masked
query logs when applying a semantic hierarchical clustering using ODP as
the knowledge source, i.e. the higher the distance between cluster sets, the
lower the retained utility. Thus, in order to select the most adequate cluster-
ing for the given data we use the well-known Calinski-Harabasz index [13].
Differences are quantified according to a well-known distance measure be-
tween partitions [22]. Formally, being PA a partition of the original data,
and PB a partition of the anonymized one, this distance is defined in Equa-
tion 5.17.
dPart(PA, PB) =
2× I(PA ∩ PB)− I(PA = −I(PB)
I(PA ∩ PB)
(5.17)
, where I(PA) is the average information of PA which measures the random-
ness of the distribution of elements over the set of classes of the partition
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(similarly for and I(PB)), and I(PA∩PB) is the mutual average information
of the intersection of two partitions [22].
Notice that the distance values obtained are normalized in the [0..1] interval,
where 0 indicates identical clusters and 1 maximally different ones. Also,
note that the scale is logarithmic, so that it grows according to the amount
of differences observed.
Definition (Information Loss (IL)). The percentage of IL of masked query
logs is quantified as the distance between the obtained partitions for the
original (PA) and anonymized data (PB), in Equation 5.18.
IL = dPart(PA, PB)× 100 (5.18)
Another way to evaluate data utility is to analyze the queries’ distribution.
Information loss can be defined in terms of these differences. Naturally, the
larger the difference, the larger the loss. Queries that appear more times are
considered to be the most important ones in the log. Thus, we propose to
calculate the frequency preservation of the 10 most frequent queries of each
log, and the preservation of the 10 most frequent categories of each log as
well.
To measure the Disclosure Risk (DR) of anonymized query logs, we rely
on one of the most common measures: Record Linkage(RL) [76]. It quan-
tifies the amount of records (i.e. query logs) that can be correctly matched
between the original dataset and the anonymized one. It assumes that a
potential attacker would match the least distant original and anonymized
records by comparing their queries and picking up the pair or pairs (if sev-
eral result in the same value) with the highest amount of queries in common.
Formally, being ur an original record (i.e., the original query log of a user),
urA its anonymized version, and Prl(urA) the record linkage probability of
an anonymized record to be disclosed, the percentage of RL is calculated as
follows.
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0 if ur /∈ G
1
|G| if ur ∈ G
, where G is the set of original records that have been linked to urA .
Thus, each urA is compared to all records of the original dataset, picking up
the pair or pairs with the highest amount of queries in common with urA ,
obtaining the G set of matched records. If ur is in G, then the probability of
record linkage is computed as the probability of finding ur in G. Otherwise,
the record linkage probability is 0. Moreover, we also calculate RL using
ODP categories instead of queries, in order to observe the amount of records
that can be correctly matched, only knowing the interests (categories) of the
users.
In a similar fashion, section 4.5 has proposed the Profile Exposure Level
(PEL) measure, which quantifies the uncertainty reduction in the original
query logs when an attacker obtains the corresponding anonymized logs.
Unlike RL, which is based on query matches, PEL calculates the information
that a protected log provides about an original log (mutual information) in
terms of Shannon entropy. Hence, we propose to evaluate the privacy of the
anonimized logs, using PEL with queries and categories.
5.5.2.2 Comparison
In order to evaluate the contribution of our proposal against related works
on query anonymization, we have implemented and tested the methods (in-
troduced in section 3.2) that, as ours, are based on microaggregation, and
most recent/elaborated methods based on query removal:
107
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
CHAPTER 5. SERVER-SIDE ANONYMIZATION
• Korolova et al. [57]: a method based on the removal of scarcest queries
(i.e. a priori, the most identifying queries) from the dataset.
• Poblete et al. [82]: another method based on query removal, in this
case, relying on a graph-based representation of queries.
• Navarro et al.(Section 5.3): a method based on query microaggrega-
tion, proposing several syntactical measures to compare queries. In
addition, other query features (like clicked URLs or timestamps) are
considered to better differentiate and compare query logs.
• Erola et al.(Section 5.4): a method that compares queries at a concep-
tual level by using ODP categories. Even though a degree of semantics
is considered during query aggregation, prototypes are randomly gen-
erated.
In addition to the above methods, we have also implemented a simplified
version of our proposal in which no semantics are considered at all. In this
case, neither query processing nor ODP are used. Queries are treated as
simple strings and compared according to their equality/inequality. In the
aggregation step, the representative query log is built only considering the
distribution of queries. This method aims at evaluating the degree of data
utility that can be retained when the query aggregation is solely focused on
data distribution.
5.5.2.3 Results
The evaluation has been done using real query logs extracted from the AOL
logs. From these, the query logs of 1 000 users have been randomly taken.
They contain about 56 000 individual queries, of which around the 61% can
be considered complex queries.
The data have been anonymized by means of our method and those in-
troduced in section 5.5.2.2. For methods based on the k-anonymity model
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(our proposal, the non-semantic version introduced above, and the ones of
Navarro et al. and Erola et al.), k-values between 2 and 7, which resulted
in 500 to 142 clusters, have been tested. Note that, due to the high hetero-
geneity and unbounded nature of query log data (i.e., all query logs define
a unique set of queries), even the lowest k-value results in a modification of
all original query logs after the aggregation process. Hence, most changes
are observed for the tested k-value range. Other methods based on query
removal (Korolova et al. and Poblete et al.) have been tested varying their
corresponding anonymization parameters in reasonable margins (a d value
ranging from 1 to 20 for Korolova et. al and a Kp value ranging from 2
to 40 for Poblete et al.). Anonymized datasets for the different approaches
and anonymization degrees have been evaluated and compared according
to their information loss (Figure 5.13) and record linkage (Figure 5.16), as
detailed in section 5.1. Since k-anonymity values and those of the d and
Kp parameters used in Korolova et al. and Poblete et al. approaches are
not directly comparable, results are shown in different figures. To measure
information loss as a function of the distance between data clusterization re-
sults, partitions with 80 clusters (according to the Calinski-Harabasz index)
have been created.
After the analysis of information loss figures, we immediately observe a very
noticeable difference between the Korolova et al. method and the other ones.
The former results in high information loss figures, which state that the
conclusions of the analysis of anonymized data will significantly differ from
those obtained for the analysis of original query logs. As a result, the utility
of masked data is severely hampered. The high degree of query removal
performed by Korolova et al. (from a 88% of query removal for d=1 to a
90% for d=20) is, in fact, the least desirable solution from the data analysis
perspective, since the semantics provided by the large amount of removed
queries are completely lost in the anonymized dataset. Since it is based on
the removal of scarcest queries of the dataset and, considering that most
queries appeared once, even for the more relaxed anonymization parameter
(d), it resulted in the complete removal of all queries for a considerable
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Figure 5.13: Information Loss (IL).
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amount of users (i.e., for d=1, about a 46% of users had all their queries
removed, whilst this figure increases to 65% for d=5).
In comparison, the method by Poblete et al. results in lower information
loss figures, since its removal strategy is more focused on queries producing
too little results, when queried in a search engine (parameter Kp), than on
their distribution in the dataset. As a result, it removes a significantly lower
amount of queries (i.e., for Kp=30 only a 10% of users had all their queries
removed).
In general, methods based on query log aggregation better retain the utility
of query logs. Moreover, since all of them are based on the k-anonymity
model, their results can be compared under the same conditions. Among
them, the worst was the one based solely on boolean comparisons between
queries (i.e., the non-semantic implementation of our proposal). Since queries
can only be evaluated as identical or different, and, since most queries in
the dataset are unique, few evidences of similarity that can guide the par-
tition and aggregation processes can be gathered. In this case, only query
distribution (i.e. their number of repetitions) is considered. Better results
are obtained for the method by Navarro et al. Even though it is also based
on terminological comparisons, it enables a more fuzzy evaluation of query
similarity thanks to the use of the Edit distance to compare Strings. This,
combined with the evaluation of other query features such as the timestamps
or clicked URLs, enables a finer grained comparison between queries and,
hence, a more accurate aggregation.
However, these approaches do not consider query semantics in an explicit
way. Even though terminological resemblance is an evidence of semantic
similarity, it poorly captures and evaluates the meaning of queries. The ap-
proach by Erola et al. exploits ODP to retrieve categories to which queries
refer, and evaluates the number of terminologically identical categories be-
tween query logs as a measure of similarity. Since categories define a more
constrained set of modalities than query logs, the chance of discovering
terminological matchings increases and so do the evidences of similarity.
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Moreover, since categories are conceptualizations of textual queries, this ap-
proach enables a semantically-coherent partition of query logs. However, no
semantic evidences are used during the aggregation process, which is solely
focused on the preserving of the distribution of queries.
Finally, our method provides the lowest information loss for all k-values.
Also note that since the dPart(PA,PB) (see Equation 5.17) function used to
compute information loss has a logarithmic scale, the absolute differences in
partitions for high information loss values are greater than for lower ones.
The obtained improvement is the result of considering both the semantics
of queries and their distribution in all stages of the query anonymization
process (i.e. comparison between queries, centroid selection, cluster con-
struction and data aggregation), relying on a semantically-coherent distance
measure and ODP categories. Also note that the query processing stage also
contributes to interpret semantics of complex queries (i.e. those with several
word or noun phrases) more coherently, in comparison with methods that
treat queries word by word [37, 75].
Figure 5.14 shows the frequency preservation of the queries. As before, we
immediately observe that Korolova et al. obtains the worst results due to
the excessive query removal. The aggregation based method by Erola et
al., the non-semantic method and our method achieve close results. On
the contrary, Navarro et al. obtains nearly 5% of better results, since it
aggregates the logs taking special care to maintain the frequencies of the
most important queries. However, greater results are obtained by Poblete
et al., as it slightly modifies the query logs.
If we compare this figure with Figure 5.15, which shows the frequency preser-
vation of the categories, we can observe that Korolova et al. and Poblete
et al. are still the best and the worst, respectively. Within the aggregation
based methods, we can observe that the non-semantic method achieves the
worst results. The methods by Navarro et al. and Erola et al. better main-
tain the frequencies, as a result of considering some similarity resemblance
during the clustering. Finally, our method attains the best results, as an
112
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 

















































































Figure 5.14: Frequency preservation of most common queries.
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Figure 5.15: Frequency preservation of most common categories.
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effect of considering query semantics as much as their distributions during
anonymization.
Disclosure risk evaluates the chance by an intruder to match original and
anonymized records, and directly depends on the degree of distortion in-
troduced in the anonymized dataset. Since disclosure risk is based on the
degree of overlapping between query logs, the more different they are with
respect to original ones, the more private the results will be. After analyzing
disclosure risk figures, we observe that the method by Korolova et al. results
in the lowest figures (between 25% of matched records for d=1 to almost
0% for d=20). As stated above, this is caused by the great amount of user
logs for which all queries have been removed. Obviously, if no queries are
available, no linkage is possible, but it also becomes useless for statistical
and data analysis due to the high information loss.
The method by Poblete et al. results in higher figures (around 63% of link-
ages for Kp>5) (Figure 5.17). This method removes a significantly lower
amount of query logs (i.e., for Kp=30 only a 10% of query logs have been
completely removed). These results, in combination with the fact that non-
removed queries appear as it is in the masked dataset (i.e. no transforma-
tion, swapping or replacement is done), increase the chance of discovering
correct linkages with original logs.
Within the aggregation based methods, the one solely based on query distri-
bution (i.e., the non-semantic version of our proposal) results in the highest
amount of linkages. In this case, the fact that queries can only be evaluated
in a Boolean fashion, and the fact that query logs are aggregated according
to their distributional properties, limit the amount of distortion introduced
in the anonymized data and increase the chance of linkage.
Our method is able to minimize the information loss of anonymized data
and at the same time it is also able to maintain the amount of linkages
as low as the methods based on query aggregation do. In this case, even
though semantics of anonymized data are better retained, the fact that the
aggregation is made by randomly rearranging queries of different users (while
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Figure 5.16: Record Linkage (RL).
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Figure 5.17: Record Linkage (RL) with categories.
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maintaining their distribution and semantics) contributes to maintain record
linkage at levels comparable to those of related works. Hence, queries of the
masked log can be different from those in the original one, although they
will cover similar topics.
Figure 5.17 demonstrates the above statement. The RL of categories that
aggregation methods obtain is close, except in the case of our method, which
achieves significantly better results. As it happens with the frequencies, this
is the effect of considering semantics and distributions during anonymiza-
tion. The methods by Poblete et al. and Korolova et al. achieve similar
observations to RL of queries.
The amount of information that anonymized query logs exposes is shown
in Figure 5.18. Korolova et al. method obtains the best results (lowest
exposure), yet it is at the expense of a vast amount of query suppressions.
On the other hand, the method by Poblete et al. exposes a great deal
of information while its information loss is low. The aggregation based
methods achieve close results with the theoretical PEL, which is inversely
proportional to k.
Finally, Figure 5.19 shows PEL results using categories. It can be noticed
that results are lower than PEL results using categories. As we stated
before, categories define a more constrained set of modalities than queries,
thus the probability to find similarities increases. Methods based on query
aggregation obtain a quite comparable amount of linkages, which decrease
almost linearly as the k-anonymity level increases. From these, the non-
semantic method achieves slightly worst results, due to the simple Boolean
comparison of the queries. The methods by Poblete et al. and Korolova
et al. achieve similar observations to PEL with queries. The former seems
to achieve lineal results, but this is caused by high similarity values, which
range from 95% to 93%.
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Figure 5.18: Profile Exposure Level (PEL).
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Figure 5.19: Profile Exposure Level (PEL) with categories.
120
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIVACY IN WEB SEARCH ENGINES 
Arnau Erola Cañellas 
Dipòsit Legal: T 349-2014 
 
5.5. Semantic microaggregation optimization
5.5.3 Conclusions
We presented a novel query log microaggregation technique that semanti-
cally interpret queries by extracting their conceptualizations from the ODP
structured set of categories. This enables to aggregate query logs semanti-
cally by means of an adaptation of the MDAV algorithm. Suitable semantic
operators to compare and average query logs have been proposed for that
purpose. Finally, a method to generate synthetic query logs composed by
real queries, which replace original ones, is also proposed. This method
preserves the semantics and distribution of original queries, while keeping
disclosure risk at a reasonable level.
The evaluation carried out with a set of real query logs extracted from
the AOL dataset sustains the suitability of our method. Compared to re-
lated works based on query removal or non-semantic query aggregation, our
proposal better retained data utility while maintaining a desirable level of
disclosure risk.
5.5.3.1 Publications
• M. Batet, A. Erola, D. Sánchez, J. Castellà-Roca, Utility preserving
query log anonymization via semantic microaggregation, Information
Sciences, Vol. 242, pp. 49-63, Sep 2013, ISSN: 0020-0255.
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The present thesis has dealt with privacy disclosure risks in web search.
While most of the research on privacy protection of queries focuses on min-
imizing disclosure risks, our aim has been to ensure the privacy of the users
while minimizing information loss. To that end, we have addressed the
problem from two different sides: the client-side and the server-side.
In the former, we have presented a collaborative method where users provide
privacy in a social network. Basically, a user submits queries on behalf of
her neighbors and conversely. Thus, users’ profiles become obfuscated. The
evaluation has shown that users achieve some privacy degree because they
expose a small number of their real queries, even with the presence of selfish
users. Moreover, the acceptable query delay makes the system usable in
practice.
In the latter, three techniques to anonymize query logs by means of mi-
croaggregation have been presented. Our proposals provide a high degree of
privacy (k-anonymity) while maintaining some data utility. That is, from
the protected data set, there are k indistinguishable users. Any attack which
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attempts to re-identify a user, will end up with a set of k potential users,
so the probability of re-identification is directly related to the size of the
parameter k used in the microaggregation. Moreover, our proposals have
the advantage that can be adapted to offer higher privacy guarantees, as
l-diversity and t-closeness.
Therefore, in order to find a good trade-off between privacy and utility, in-
formation loss should be minimized. To that end, partition and aggregation
operators to deal with query logs should be defined. Our first proposal uses
an aggregation of several distance functions and the MDAV algorithm to
cluster the logs. Then, the aggregation operator takes special care to main-
tain frequencies of the queries. However, while preserving some properties
of the original queries, they do not take the meaning of the queries into
account.
WSE use query logs that contain the users’ interests, in order to create
detailed profiles of their users. Hence, the utility of the data is related to
ability to construct these profiles. By pursuing this idea, we introduce the
concept of semantic microaggregation in our second proposal. To that end,
the partition operation takes the semantics of the query terms into account.
Semantics are extracted by classifying the query terms in a structured knowl-
edge base, which provides a metric space to define the distance between two
logs. Experimental results show that the method outperforms the utility of
the previous proposals.
However, while the interpretation of the real meaning (user’s interest) of
simple queries (queries composed of one or two terms) is possible in the
knowledge base, the interpretation of complex queries (queries composed of
several words) requires some advanced techniques. The interpretation of
complex queries from the interpretation of their terms perturbs the query’s
semantics, as the relations between their terms are omitted. In order to solve
this problem, we have proposed our third method, which maps users’ queries
to their formal semantics using some linguistic analysis and the same knowl-
edge base. The method has been compared with our previous proposals, a
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random proposal and Korolova et al. [57] and Poblete et al. [82] proposals.
The evaluation using data mining methods shows that it clearly maintains
more data utility than other proposals, while the record linkage is as low as
the obtained by the other methods at minimum.
6.2 Future work
Here, we sketch some open problems that can be addressed in the future.
• In the client-side method, the quality of the service is related to the
reliability of the interests of the user. We will consider using a special-
ized social network in order to get more homogeneous shared interests
between users. This enhancement should improve the quality of the
service. Nevertheless, there are some privacy issues that must be in-
vestigated.
• The vast amount of queries WSEs receive every day, should be taken
into consideration in order to apply the presented methods. While the
methods offer good privacy and data utility, their performance dealing
with large datasets has not been evaluated. The way to deal with vast
volumes of queries should be studied.
• The interpretation of queries is conditional on the knowledge base.
Different knowledge bases (or even when the same knowledge base has
been updated) can have different query’ interpretations, thus provid-
ing different distances between two queries. Therefore, the obtained
results by using our methods can be altered if we change the knowl-
edge base. Different ways to compare search logs that do not depend
on external sources should be investigated.
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• A. Erola, J. Castellà-Roca, G. Navarro-Arribas and V. Torra, Seman-
tic microaggregation for the anonymization of query logs using the open
directory project, SORT-Statistics and Operations Research Transac-
tions, Vol. 0, Special issue, pp. 41-58, Sep 2011, ISSN: 1696-2281
• M. Batet, A. Erola, D. Sánchez, J. Castellà-Roca, Utility preserving
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mediante la semántica de las consultas, RECSI 2012, Donostia, Spain,
In Actas de la XII Reunión Espaola sobre Criptoloǵıa y Seguridad de
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